Non-proliferation regime
What is “Non-Proliferation”?
Nuclear era began in 1945, when the USA became the first state, which tested the nuclear weapon, and it was the first (and the only) state, which applied it. The USSR inevitably followed the USA, thus in 1949 it tested the first nuclear explosive device. In 1952 nuclear weapon was developed in Great Britain, in 1960 – in France, and in 1964 – in China. The pressing issue of prevention of nuclear war was simultaneously brought up, since the experience of Japan turned out to be too horrible to consider nuclear weapon only as “more powerful bomb”.
The meaning of non-proliferation regime
In 1950-s it seemed that the world would resort to the proliferation of nuclear weapon, as it traditionally happened with all new types of weapon. Most states including Australia, Egypt, Switzerland and Sweden, having more or less developed science and economy, launched their own nuclear programs. Nonetheless, at the turn of 1950-1960s the situation began to change.
What is “Non-Proliferation”?
Nuclear era began in 1945, when the USA became the first state, which tested the nuclear weapon, and it was the first (and the only) state, which applied it. The USSR inevitably followed the USA, thus in 1949 it tested the first nuclear explosive device. In 1952 nuclear weapon was developed in Great Britain, in 1960 – in France, and in 1964 – in China. The pressing issue of prevention of nuclear war was simultaneously brought up, since the experience of Japan turned out to be too horrible to consider nuclear weapon only as “more powerful bomb”.
The meaning of non-proliferation regime
In 1950-s it seemed that the world would resort to the proliferation of nuclear weapon, as it traditionally happened with all new types of weapon. Most states including Australia, Egypt, Switzerland and Sweden, having more or less developed science and economy, launched their own nuclear programs. Nonetheless, at the turn of 1950-1960s the situation began to change.
It became clear what the consequences of nuclear weapon uses could be; people began to realize that nuclear weapon was of a little use for such traditional military purposes as acquisition of a territory, achievement of limited political goals etc. because of its huge destructive force; there was a mass anti-nuclear movement of society; it became obvious for many countries that expenses for its development were prohibitive; group of states that had already acquired nuclear weapons, was ready to prevent the appearance of new nuclear nations.
A growing number of states began to refrain from acquiring of nuclear weapon upon condition of certain security guarantees, first of all guarantee that their neighbors and potential enemies would also be non-nuclear.
On the other hand, countries that had already developed nuclear weapons, did not show their desire to eliminate nuclear arsenals, at least in the nearest future (complete nuclear disarmament was declared by them as long-term objective). Therefore, attempts of the most of countries to prevent nuclear aggression by means of creation of nuclear-free world could not have been realized completely.
It is necessary to take into account that military nuclear programs of the most of countries were not planned as a response to the nuclear weapons of the main nuclear states. Thus, Israel program was mainly connected with lack of regional situation proper regulation, in particular with threatening feeling caused by Arab countries. Egyptian nuclear program was provoked with threatening feeling from Israel side, and, particularly in 1950-s, with fear of policy of Great Britain and France (in 1956 they tried to capture control under Suez Canal).
Therefore, by 1960s it was controversial situation. On the one hand, the very fact that nuclear weapons belonged to the small group of countries, provoked its proliferation, on the other hand – most countries were interested in abolition of nuclear weapons in order to prevent its proliferation.
In 1960-s, as a result of protracted official and private negotiations, it was achieved a sort of compromise, that is Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) according to which only five states that had had nuclear weapons by the time of entry into this treaty, reserved the right to possess it officially, while the vast majority of other countries voluntarily resign this right. From the viewpoint of neighbors’ relations, the fact that most countries considered uses of nuclear weapons only for the regional purposes, essentially facilitated the achievement of this compromise.
Within the framework of NPT, the reverse side of this tacit recognition of five countries uniqueness was their obligation to work towards nuclear disarmament. However this responsibility is one of the weakest links of non-proliferation regime, since the process of disarmament is a complicated, long-term and quite expensive issue, as it turned out at the end of 1980s.
Nowadays only a small group of countries is beyond the non-proliferation regime, and almost all of them, namely Israel, India and Pakistan, possess nuclear weapon, although they refrain from its military expansion. Besides, the small group of countries showed their unreliability. This is, first of all, Iraq, which in 1980s implemented secret military nuclear program in contravention of its duties. and North Korea, which developed complete plutonium cycle that allows in prospect to negotiate about elaboration of nuclear weapons, and in 1994 it announced its intention to withdraw from NPT. And North Korea, which declared itself a nuclear power in 2005 and conducted three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013, but in 2003 the DPRK has finally ceased to be a member of the NPT.
Despite the complexity and contradictions of non-proliferation regime and threats to its existence, the very regime became a part of international relations system and one of the cornerstones of legal infrastructure of international security.
Definition and context of non-proliferation regime
The context of the meaning of non-proliferation regime is intuitively obvious, since it refers to the actions that prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and provide unreversed decisions of countries that refused nuclear weapons acquisition. At the same time this regime is so complicated, that intuitive definition is rather insufficient. It is required not only more rigorous definition, but the understanding of context, in which the very regime exists, in particular its connection with the regimes of non-proliferation of other types of mass destruction weapon and reduction of armaments.
Non-proliferation regime is the complex of international agreements and organizations, the participants of which are nuclear as well as non-nuclear states, and domestic legislations of member states, the aim of which is to prevent those nations from acquisition of nuclear status that had not had it till 1967.
The subject of the regime is all possible nuclear explosive devices (since it was not possible to recognize nuclear explosive devices that are used for military and peaceful purposes, although in most cases it refers to weapon) as well as materials, tools and technologies intended for its production.
The mechanism of the regime lies in the regulation of member states behavior that includes preservation of non-nuclear status of members that had not had nuclear weapon till 1967; non-transfer of nuclear explosive devises, materials, equipment and technologies intended for its elaboration and production for countries that do not participate in regime or intend to violate it; refusal of non-nuclear states of acquiring of materials, equipments and technologies, as well as nuclear explosive devices; and the conduct of negotiations among nuclear member states of nuclear weapon elimination regime.
Definition given above includes a range of significant aspects that require special examination.
Firstly, this regime is mentioned in the number of interrelated international agreements of different status, among which Treaty of Non-proliferation holds a central position. There are other important agreements along with it, such as Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and conventions concluded under the aegis of Agency.
The complex of agreements on reduction of nuclear weapon, including bilateral agreements between the USSR (Russia) and the USA, and a number of multilateral treaties (for instance, on nuclear weapon test ban, on nonconformity of weapons in Antarctic, on the Moon and other celestial bodies, and at the bottom of seas and oceans etc.) joins the system of treaties directly related to non-proliferation regime. Treaties on Establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) are directly connected to non-proliferation regime.
Secondly, non-proliferation regime is institutionally developed, that is it includes an essential amount of organizations and other forms of regular cooperation of members. Thus, IAEA became the part of regime, and key functions were transferred to it. The aim of these functions is to ensure effectiveness of the regime, also determine what materials are subjected to control, and control the activity of nuclear and non-nuclear member states on-site.
Two international mechanisms are the part of regime. Officially these mechanisms do not belong to the given regime, but in the sphere of expert control they play a key role in formulation of joint actions of advanced countries (that is those countries which have something to transfer to potential violators). This is Nuclear Exporters Committee, known as Zangger Committee, which was set up in 1971, and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), established in 1974.
Dense network of various institutions that unite all participants of regime, strengthens its stability and ability to respond to the changes of situation in time, elaborating measures to improve efficiency.
Thirdly, domestic legislation of every member state of regime is the part of it, especially those states which have highly developed nuclear industry. It concerns, particularly, the legislation on accounting and control over fissile materials and nuclear explosive devices, and legislation on export control system that prevents illegal and contraband exportation of items abroad that are subjected to control. In this sphere national legislation is based on the system of guarantees elaborated by IAEA, and documents of Zangger Committee and NSG. At the same time each party uses these documents in their own manner in their legal practice, establishing even more severe restrictions than it is required in international documents, and in addition it settle an issue of their implementation.
Nuclear weapons are defined as nuclear devices with uncontrolled release of energy that is produced during fission and fusion of fissile materials, and it is used for military purposes. There is no generally accepted definition for nuclear explosive devices: for example, each Treaty on Establishment of NWFZ has its own definition, though all of them are similar.
Nuclear weapons, alongside with chemical and biological weapons are the parts of broader concept of weapons of mass destruction. Distinctive feature of all types of WMD is ability to kill people massively and unselectively. Nuclear weapons attract close attention because of its demolition character, ability to destruct not only people but buildings and material values, and serious long-term environmental impact. That is why it is paid so careful attention to it in the sphere of disarmament activity, and the first and the most developed non-proliferation regime was connected to it not by chance.
The practice has shown that it is easier to restrict the spread of nuclear weapon than other types of WMD, since its development requires specific materials and equipment, that are more manageable, and significant financial resources.
Source:
- Nuclear non-proliferation [Ядерное нераспространение]. В 2-х томах. Том I/И.А.Ахтамзян и др. Под. общ. ред. В.А.Орлова. 2-е изд., переработанное и расширенное. – М.: ПИР-Центр, 2002. – С.11-37.
International Cooperation in Non-Proliferation Area
Owing to continuous efforts, the world community has developed a great number of multilateral agreements aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals, prohibition of their placing in specific regions of the world and natural environments (such as outer space and ocean bottoms), restriction of their proliferation and termination of nuclear weapon tests.
The main issue in this sphere is to reduce nuclear armament, support efficiency of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent development and spreading of ballistic missiles and missile protection systems.
Owing to continuous efforts, the world community has developed a great number of multilateral agreements aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals, prohibition of their placing in specific regions of the world and natural environments (such as outer space and ocean bottoms), restriction of their proliferation and termination of nuclear weapon tests.
The main issue in this sphere is to reduce nuclear armament, support efficiency of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent development and spreading of ballistic missiles and missile protection systems.
Bilateral Treaties on Nuclear Weapons
When various international forums took efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, it was increasingly recognized that nuclear states were responsible for maintaining the stability and reliability of international safety. During the “cold war” and after its termination, the two major nuclear states signed agreements that significantly reduced the hazard of nuclear war.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty, 1972) limits the number of anti-missile systems of the United States and the former Soviet Union to one system. The Demarcation Agreement of 1997 between the United States and the Russian Federation marks a distinction between “strategic”, or long-range anti-ballistic missile systems which are prohibited, and “non-strategic”, or shorter-range anti-ballistic missiles which are not prohibited. The Treaty ceased to be in force on 13 June 2002 when the United States withdrew from it.
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles signed in 1987 liquidated a class of nuclear arms which included all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 km. Up to the end of 1996 all the arms to be destroyed were liquidated in accordance with the Treaty.
In 1991 the Soviet-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) set a range of 6000 warheads at a total of 1600 long-range ballistic missiles, which reduced the level of missiles accumulated in 1991 approximately by 30%.
The Lisbon Protocol to START-1 signed in 1992 obliged the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics to assume the obligations of START-1. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine should join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear states. Up to 1996 these three states eliminated all nuclear arms from their territories.
The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2) signed in 1993 obliged the both parties to reduce the quantity of warheads on long-range nuclear missiles to 3500 units for each party and liquidated ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The Treaty of 1997 continues the final deadline for destruction of launcher systems – missile launch facilities, bombers and submarines – up to the end of 2007, as soon as START-2 comes into force.
On 24 May 2004 the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Moscow, according to which the number of strategic nuclear warheads is agreed not to exceed 1700-2200. The Treaty is valid up to 31 December 2012 and may be continued on the agreement of the parties or replaced earlier than the set date by the subsequent treaty.
Multilateral Treaties on Nuclear Weapons
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the most universal of all the multilateral agreements on disarmament, was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The NPT is a cornerstone for the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime and is a basis for the process of nuclear disarmament.
The NPT Review Conference in 2000 approved the Final Document in which states possessing nuclear weapons were obliged to perform “An unequivocal undertaking … to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals”.
The Conference agreed on the necessity of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapon capabilities and diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies. The public was highly aware of the decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty in 2003. It is the first decision of such a type since the day of the Treaty approval.
The NPT Review Conference of 2005 was conducted from 2 to 27 May in New York.
In order to confirm obligations defined by the NPT, the member states are required to approve safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In 1996 the major part of the members of the General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for banning of nuclear tests. The Treaty was first offered in 1954, and it took 40 years to adopt it. It is considered a continuation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in any environment adopted in 1963. The CTBT was opened for signature in 1996, but it is still to come in force. 12 states out of 44 named in Annex 2 whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty to come into force have not ratified it yet.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, as a depositary of the Treaty, convoked the Conference three times in order to contribute to CTBT coming into force: in 1999, 2001 and 2003.
170 states that signed the Treaty participate in the Preparatory Commission for CTBT Organization. The Technical Secretariat created in 1997 continues preparatory activities to maintain the international system of monitoring up to the moment the CTBT comes into force. The Agreement to Regulate the Relationships between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission was signed in 2000.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty) signed in 1967, as an event which envisaged new achievements in regional control of arms, was the first to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in this densely populated region of the world. After the ratification of the relevant instrument by Cuba in 2002, the Latin America and the Caribbean nuclear-weapon-free zone includes all the states of this region.
After this epochal treaty, three other agreements on the creation of NWFZ were signed: in the Southern part of the Pacific Ocean (the Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985), in the South-Eastern Asia (The Treaty of Bangkok, 1995) and in Africa (The Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996). By means of these agreements all the populated part of the Southern hemisphere has a nuclear free zone status. In September 2002 five states of the Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) gave a prior consent within the Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone of the Central Asia. There are offers on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Central Europe and Southern Asia, as well as the creation of the zone free of nuclear weapons of mass destruction in the Near East. The conception of a separate state as a nuclear-weapon-free zone was approved by the international community in 1998 when the General Assembly supported proclamation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone by Mongolia.
Cooperation within International Organizations
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an important role in the international efforts aimed at prevention of nuclear weapons. The IAEA is a unique international inspector in the world on issues concerning nuclear safeguards and control of activities in the sphere of civil nuclear programs.
The IAEA created within the United Nations (UN) in 1957 as an independent organization is an embodiment of the program speech of Eisenhower, the President of the USA, “Atom for Peace” which was issued at the session of the UN General Assembly in 1953. He offered to create international authority which would be aimed at control of nuclear energy and contribute to its use. Services and activities of the IAEA in various spheres are implemented in the interests of 151 member states (as of November 2010).
The main objective of the IAEA according to the Article II of the Agency’s Statute is to contribute to the use of nuclear energy for the peaceful purposes and to ensure that it is not used as to further any military purpose. According to Article III of the Statute, the objectives are as follows: first, to encourage research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses; second, to make provisions for services, materials, equipment and facilities; third, to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information; fourth, to encourage the exchange of scientists; fifth, to establish safeguards; sixth, to establish standards of safety for protection of health; and, seventh, to acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment.
The main authorities of the IAEA are the General Conference which consists of all the members of the Agency and meets at the session once a year, the Board of Governors which consists of 35 members and carries out several sessions per year, and Secretariat which is headed by the Director General.
The significant obligation within the IAEA activity is defined by Article III of the Statute which is “To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy”.
In order to contribute to the prevention of further spreading of nuclear weapons, the IAEA uses a system of agreements on safeguards. Safeguards are a set of measures by which the IAEA wants to justify that a state meets its international responsibilities not to apply nuclear programs for the purpose to create nuclear weapons.
The major part of safeguards agreements is signed with states which undertook, at the international level, not to possess nuclear weapons on the basis of the Global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the IAEA is an inspection authority.
Inspection performed by the IAEA helps to ensure confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear materials, facilities and activities. This helps to reduce safety concerns of the states caused by the development of nuclear weapons. “Additional Protocols” to the safeguards agreements with the states contribute to further enhancement of the inspection regime provided by the IAEA. According to these Protocols, the states are obliged to submit to the IAEA more complete information on all the aspects of activities within the nuclear fuel cycle. They also should grant the IAEA with the right of wider access and to allow it to apply the most state-of-the-art inspection technologies. In the customary regime, activities concerning safeguards are performed at more than 900 facilities around the world, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel facilities and storage sites.
Regional Organizations
Along with the universal organization in the sphere of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, IAEA, and international mechanisms, NSG and Zangger Committee, there are regional organizations in this area.
The Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community) is the most powerful regional organization. It was created in 1957 according to the Treaty of Rome which came into force on 1 January 1958. In 1967 Euratom institutes merged with EU institutions. The initial members were as follows: Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, France and FRG. At present 27 EU member states are in Euratom.
The objective of the Euratom is to assist in creation and development of nuclear industry, joint research, exchange of scientific and technical information, creation of a common market of equipment and materials. It also must be ensured that ores, source materials and special fissile materials are not diverted from the intended uses.
In the development of the NPT in 1966-1968, Euratom states under support of the USA insisted on applying Euratom safeguards in these countries rather than the IAEA ones. As a result, it was decided that Euratom would sign a multilateral agreement with the IAEA on the Agency’s safeguards in the Euratom states.
Inspectors of Euratom perform inspections under surveillance of the IAEA inspectors or jointly with them, but joint activities caused significant doubling and excessive expenses. In relation to this, in 1992 there was a “new approach to partnership” between the IAEA and Euratom based on the principle “one task, one person”, which helped to significantly reduce the scope of inspection activities of the Agency in the IAEA states with regard to nuclear activity of Euratom.
It is necessary to mention the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) which is a semi-independent institution within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) among other international organizations on nuclear energy of the regional level. The Agency was created in 1958 and was called the European Nuclear Energy Agency, but in 1972 the name was replaced by the NEA as the USA, Canada and some other non-European countries joined it. The objective of the Agency is to ensure cooperation in the development, safety, and regulation of nuclear energy, that is why it is important for the purposes of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Authorities founded according to agreements on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones belong to regional organizations in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation.
References:
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Training Manual for University Students. 2 Volumes. Vol. 1, I. A. Akhtamzyan et al. Edited by V. A. Orlova. 2 ed., revised. M. PIR-Center, 2002, pp. 116-149;
- http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/Russian/iaea-primer_rus.pdf;
- http://www.un.org/ru/peace/disarmament/massdestr.shtml.
Participation of Ukraine in Non-Proliferation Regime
The issue of Ukraine’s attitude towards nuclear weapons located within its territory arose long before the formal proclamation of its independence. This was reflected in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine and in the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada “On Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine”, which confirmed intentions of our State to meet three non-nuclear principles: non-possession, non-production and non-use of nuclear weapons.
With Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada “On Additional Measures on Ensuring Ukraine’s Acquisition of Non-Nuclear Status” No. 2264-XII dated 9 April 1992, Agreement “On Procedure for Transfer of Nuclear Weapons from the Territory of Ukraine to Central Industrial Bases of the Russian Federation with the Objective to Dismantle Them and Destroy” was developed and signed by the Presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on 11 April 1992. In May 1992 the transportation of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine was finished. On 14 January 1994 the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia was signed with the objective to accelerate entry of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) into force and Ukraine joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to this document, the process of transportation of all strategic nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation was started in March 1994 and finished on 1 June 1996.
The issue of Ukraine’s attitude towards nuclear weapons located within its territory arose long before the formal proclamation of its independence. This was reflected in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine and in the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada “On Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine”, which confirmed intentions of our State to meet three non-nuclear principles: non-possession, non-production and non-use of nuclear weapons.
With Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada “On Additional Measures on Ensuring Ukraine’s Acquisition of Non-Nuclear Status” No. 2264-XII dated 9 April 1992, Agreement “On Procedure for Transfer of Nuclear Weapons from the Territory of Ukraine to Central Industrial Bases of the Russian Federation with the Objective to Dismantle Them and Destroy” was developed and signed by the Presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on 11 April 1992. In May 1992 the transportation of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine was finished. On 14 January 1994 the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia was signed with the objective to accelerate entry of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) into force and Ukraine joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to this document, the process of transportation of all strategic nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation was started in March 1994 and finished on 1 June 1996.
According to the Law of Ukraine dated 16 November 1994 “On Ukraine’s Joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Ukraine is a participant of the Treaty as a non-nuclear state. In this regard, after elimination of all the nuclear weapons, Ukraine was obliged not to receive nuclear weapons from any supplier, not to produce and not to purchase them. Ukraine is fully aware of a potential hazard with regard to acquisition of a nuclear status by at least one additional country and, hence, it upholds its position on the necessity to use all the possible political forces in order to prevent distribution of nuclear weapons in the world.
According to Article III of the NPT, “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. The second part of this Article envisages that each State Party to the Treaty “undertakes not to provide: a) source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards”.
According to this Article, Ukraine signed and ratified an Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards in relation to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is a standard agreement which comes into force right after the Agency receives an official notification from the State on the performance of the relevant procedures. The standard agreement defines scientific and technical framework of all IAEA practices envisaged by NPT Article III.1. The main tasks are defined, and so is the procedure for implementation of the safeguards, including beginning and termination of control, exemption from safeguards and registration of results of the Agency’s activity related to control. Specific safeguards procedures and methods are developed, particularly procedure for the use of national systems for nuclear material accounting and control, procedures and scope of the IAEA inspections are defined. International transfers of nuclear materials within the Agency’s safeguards are regulated.
Development of IAEA safeguards was always aimed at searching for the most efficient system, which would comply with the requirements of time. During formation of the post bipolar system of international relations when non-proliferation regime was under significantly difficult conditions, the unauthorized activity related to uranium enrichment in Iraq was revealed. This case was the impetus to find the ways to improve the non-proliferation regime and increase the efficiency of the safeguards system. It resulted in development of “Program 93+2” and acceptance of Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) by the IAEA Board of Governors. According to this document, the possibility in performing any unauthorized activity in the state is excluded mainly due to the expansion of access for IAEA inspectors to facilities where nuclear materials are used. Along with this, the weakness of INFCIRC/540 should be also stated. Signing and ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement does not result from obligations under the NPT, and is exceptionally voluntary for the states, this reduces to some extent the effectiveness of this tool. The countries that signed and ratified this Protocol are the participants of the “System of Strengthened Safeguards”.
Ukraine with a high nuclear potential and active support of the policy for improving efficiency of the non-proliferation regime carefully behaved toward a new system of IAEA safeguards. It signed the Additional Protocol on 15 August 2000 and ratified it on 16 November 2005, thus confirming its intention to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Taking into account Ukraine’s full compliance with the non-proliferation regime and its obligations under the Agreement, this document covers all nuclear activities of the state. Moreover, it was a consistent step for our state in the policy for support of the non-proliferation regime, which demonstrated exemplary fulfillment of obligations in accordance with the signed agreements.
The IAEA safeguards system constantly improves in response to the active policy of nuclear energy use by more and more countries, thus increasing the scope of using nuclear material and technologies. Such a number of inspections declared in the Agreement will further require huge economic costs. Despite the disastrous consequences of the accident at Fukushima-1 NPP, the nearest future of energy security will be closely tight with the development of nuclear energy.
According to the information presented by Yukiya Amano, IAEA Director General, during his speech at the fifty-sixth regular session the IAEA General Conference, there is envisaged stable increase in the number of nuclear power plants in the world in the next 20 years. Therefore, there is a high probability of overloading the Agency budget. This situation was the reason for finding optimal solution of the problem, which resulted in the development of the IAEA integrated safeguards system. This was another important step to optimize and improve functioning of the safeguards system. It is based on the optimal combination of traditional safeguards (INFCIRC/153) with requirements of advanced safeguards under the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540).
The objective of integrated safeguards is to ensure the creation of the most efficient mechanism for functioning of the advanced safeguards system. Therefore, new measures of control will be integrated into the already implemented procedures. Thanks to this, taking into account procedures used according to the Additional Protocol, on the one hand, it is possible to reduce the burden on the state, and on the other hand, to reduce the burden on the Agency, which will ensure maximum efficiency within available resources.
From 1 May 2012, the IAEA started to apply integrated safeguards in Ukraine, which will allow the IAEA to reach confidence in absence of unauthorized nuclear material and unauthorized nuclear activity in Ukraine, and to reduce a number of inspections.
The integrated safeguards system is characterized as one that expresses the highest level of confidence in the state, which exemplary met conditions of the Agreement on Safeguards and Additional Protocol.
Implementation of the Agreement on Safeguards in Ukraine is based on the use of data from the State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC). In order to ensure efficient functioning of SSAC in compliance with international obligations on the nuclear non-proliferation, a regulatory framework was developed and is constantly improved. The regulatory framework developed in Ukraine on the application of safeguards is as follows:
An information system is one of the most important components of SSAC. Specialists created and continue improving the state database of nuclear materials, which provides information on the quantity and composition of nuclear materials in any material balance area in order to prepare and present data on nuclear materials in accordance with international agreements of Ukraine, should such information be required by state authorities. The number of enterprises where nuclear materials are located and accounted for is 114. These enterprises and institutions are divided geographically by material balance areas: RKQ0 – 11 enterprises; RKQ1 – 23; RKQ2 – 17; RKQ3 – 27; RKQ4 – 36.
Structure of nuclear material balance areas
The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) is in charge with coordination of measures on implementation of the Agreement between Ukraine and IAEA on the Application of Safeguards with regard to the NPT, Additional Protocol to the Agreement.
In order to ensure relevant state accounting of nuclear materials and create conditions for implementation of international agreements, the SNRIU is responsible for the following:
- accounting, summary and submission of information to IAEA which is received from entities of the State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in accordance with international agreements;
- definition and coordination of nuclear material balance areas with IAEA, their state accounting and removal from accounting, maintaining of the state database on nuclear materials;
- cooperation with IAEA on matters concerning international agreements, including resolution of controversial issues;
- informing the entities of the State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials on receiving of IAEA information on organization of inspections at facilities or additional access in accordance with requirements of international agreements.
Implementation of requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards and Additional Protocol to this Agreement permits assuring the international community that Ukraine performs all its obligations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and uses nuclear power only for peaceful purposes.
Reference:
- The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine
