«Safety Is Not Negotiable»: Key Lessons from Chernobyl
We are continuing our series of interviews with Nikolai Steinberg, dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Chornobyl NPP accident. This is the final article in the series.
In the previous interviews we discussed the period before and after the Chornobyl disaster in detail, as well as the «convenient truth» about personnel errors and the «inconvenient truth» regarding the Soviet nuclear project. We also explored how total secrecy, the management’s fear of admitting mistakes, and the disregard for prior incidents made the catastrophe inevitable.
In this third part of our conversation Mr. Steinberg shares his memories of the complex process of engaging with the IAEA and revising the official findings on the causes of the accident.
This interview was prepared by SSTC NRS in collaboration with the Editorial Board of Uatom.org as part of a series of events marking the 40th anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster.
– All operational and administrative documentation relating to the accident at the Chornobyl NPP was seized and classified immediately after the event. It was stored in the archives of the Chief Designer, the Scientific Supervisor and, potentially, the KGB. What specific documents do you think are still being withheld in Russian agency archives, and what could they be hiding?
There is nothing unexpected there. These are data from recording instruments, such as chart tapes, printouts from the DREG programme, and records from the oscilloscopes used during the tests. There are presumably also copies of personnel’s explanatory notes and possibly interrogation transcripts. Let us not forget that a criminal case was launched regarding the designers’ role in the accident – surely they had to prepare their defence? They probably felt reassured once the case was closed. They finally settled down only after the collapse of the USSR.
– Mr. Steinberg, in your opinion, did the international IAEA experts who prepared the INSAG-1 report place too much trust in the Soviet delegation? Or were they deliberately prevented from seeing the operating procedures and instructions that ChNPP personnel were guided by?
Even today, the democratic West trusts the information disseminated by individuals such as mashka zakharova, lavrov and the moscow half-wit. Four years of war have taught them nothing. Besides, these are different cultures with different concepts of honour and dignity. It is impossible to comprehend!
– In your book, you mention that one of the authors of the Soviet report gave you a personalised copy of it back in 1986, but that you only read it later. When did you personally realise the scale of the falsification by the reactor designers?
When I read both the 1986 and 1987 reports. Unfortunately, the thought that lies could exist at such high levels had never occurred to me either because you judge those around you based on your own sense of integrity. Once I read them, I understood. That is when I began assembling a team to investigate the root causes and circumstances of the tragedy.
– V. Malyshev, the Chairman of the USSR Gosatomnadzor, took an unprecedented risk when he sent your commission’s 1991 report directly to the IAEA Director General, bypassing the prior approval of both the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building. Could this bold managerial decision be considered the turning point that broke the reactor designers’ monopoly on deception and compelled the international community to reconsider its position?
Yes, because in February 1991, the IAEA found itself in a very awkward position. There were three contradictory reports on the table. The results of studies conducted by Western experts had emerged. An open debate had begun in the public media. And then there was the INSAG-1 report. The Agency’s position had to be brought into alignment with reality.
– You argue that the trial of the Chornobyl NPP personnel was unfair because the court failed to consider the design flaws of the reactor as a potential cause of the disaster. Do you think Ukraine should review these court decisions today, in light of all the facts, to restore historical justice?
Yes, it is important to convey the truth to the public. It is also vital for our country to gain judicial experience in matters of safety that affect our citizens. Nuclear power plants are not the only high-risk facilities. There are also chemical and metallurgical industries, bridges and railways, aviation and much more besides. Are we prepared for the challenges that AI brings to our lives? If this is merely for the sake of producing an 18-page document, it is better not to do it at all. Naturally, politically biased figures must be kept out of the investigation.
– We are marking the 40th anniversary at a time when our largest facility, the Zaporizhzhia NPP, remains occupied. Do you think the entire international nuclear regulatory system needs to be radically reformed?
No, we need to prevent bureaucrats groomed in an atmosphere of stifling political correctness from gaining power. Furthermore, and this will be exceedingly difficult, we must determine what enforcement measures for international treaties and conventions can be developed and applied. This is particularly important when individuals akin to Iranian ayatollahs or Russian KGB operatives ascend to the highest offices of state.
– Chornobyl taught the world about safety culture, where professionalism minimises the margin for error. Is there a risk that Ukraine’s management system will once again resemble the one that led to the 1986 disaster, where political considerations and financial gain were prioritised over engineering truth? What must be done to avoid losing the knowledge gained through bitter experience and the specific immunity Ukraine has developed during its years of independence?
Many will probably disagree with my assessment, but we are already there – on the eve of 1986. The phrase «safety culture» no longer carries its original meaning. The situation is currently being kept under control by the operating personnel. We have managed to provide them with some protection through legislative and regulatory measures. Furthermore, the war has brought science and engineering to the forefront. However, this upsurge will be short-lived if nothing changes after the war ends. We must create conditions in which corruption is no longer economically viable.
– The main message for operators of any complex machinery is to «question everything» and never assume that «this cannot happen». What would your primary advice be to young engineers entering the nuclear power industry today?
The answer is already embedded in your question. I can only add: «Safety is not negotiable!»
Uatom.org Editorial Board
In the photo: Power Unit No. 4 of the Chornobyl NPP seen from the southwest in September 1986. Photo provided by the SSTC NRS from the personal archives of Nikolai Steinberg.