Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Transport: How Secure Is Radioactive Material Shipment?

Every day, thousands of radioactive material consignments, including radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, are transported around the world. The use of radiation sources in industry, medicine, and agriculture has increased significantly over the past decade, resulting in more frequent and larger shipments.

In addition, transport safety is a top priority at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle: from the shipment of uranium concentrates and new fuel assemblies for NPPs to the transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel for storage or disposal.

That is why the Uatom.org Editorial Board decided to take a closer look at this topic and prepared a new analytical piece on how secure the transport of radioactive materials is.

Incidents Related to the Transport of Radioactive Materials

As you know, the transport of radioactive materials poses a risk of accidents with potential radiation exposure. There are several known cases in world history when radioactive material transport led to negative consequences or when an incident could have potentially affected the safety of the public, property, and the environment.

Spain. In 1966, during an aerial patrol mission, a Boeing B-52G Stratofortress strategic bomber carrying nuclear bombs collided with a tanker aircraft during mid-air refueling and was damaged. As a result, four thermonuclear bombs fell: two – on the ground near the Spanish village of Palomares, and two fell into the Mediterranean Sea. When the two bombs landed, conventional non-nuclear explosives detonated, contaminating an area of approximately 2 km² with plutonium. The cleanup and removal of contaminated soil took several years. As a result of the search operations, one of the weapons was recovered from the seabed.

United Kingdom. According to reports, approximately 980 incidents related to the transport of radioactive materials were documented in the United Kingdom between 1958 and 2010. For example, in 2010, there were 30 incidents, including eight cases involving spent fuel containers that were incorrectly labeled or accompanied by documents that did not meet cargo requirements. However, as a result of these incidents, neither workers nor members of the public were exposed or received significant doses.

Australia. In January 2023, Western Australia authorities declared a radiation alert in part of the state after a small capsule containing radioactive isotope cesium-137 fell from a truck during transport. The 8-millimeter capsule was used as a source for an industrial sensor. The cargo was transported over a distance of approximately 1,400 km, and only several weeks after delivery it was discovered during an inspection that the capsule was missing. The search operation for the lost radioactive capsule covered 1,400 kilometers, from sparsely populated areas to the capital, Perth, and was successfully completed within seven days. No serious radiation contamination occurred during this period.

Although primary responsibility for safety lies with the organizations responsible for the facilities and activities that pose these risks, the IAEA Member States developed and signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1980 [1], which is largely dedicated to the physical protection of transport. This Convention not only introduced a classification of nuclear materials according to the threat they may pose if a crime is committed against them but also established general requirements for the levels of physical protection of nuclear materials during their international transport.

Design Features of Containers for the Transport of Radioactive Materials

The scope of the IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials includes the design and composition of transport packages, material categorization, documentation, and container labeling. These regulations apply to specific transport activities, including actual shipments, special arrangements, and the transport index assigned to a package to ensure control over radiation exposure.

There are the following types of containers for the transport of radioactive materials [9]:

• type A containers: used for radiopharmaceuticals, radionuclides for industrial application, and certain types of radioactive waste;
• type B(U) or B(M) containers: range from small containers weighing a few kilograms (for example, those containing radiation sources) to large packages weighing up to 100 tons (for example, those containing spent nuclear fuel);
• type C containers: designed for the transport of high-level radioactive materials by aircraft.

Containers for the transport of spent nuclear fuel have walls made of steel and protective materials with thicknesses ranging from 12 to 38 cm. They are also tightly sealed with a solid lid. These design features are developed to protect workers and the public against radiation. Containers transported by trucks weigh approximately 25 tons when loaded with 1–2 tons of spent fuel. Containers for rail transport can weigh up to 180 tons and carry up to 25 tons of spent fuel inside. Externally, the containers are impact-resistant, and in the event of an accident, impact limiters are crashed to absorb the force of the collision, protecting both the container and its cargo. Spent fuel containers are tightly sealed and partially shield the spent fuel, as it is impossible to completely block all radiation with shielding.

Before use, the container design should undergo testing under normal and hypothetical emergency conditions, including drops onto a hard surface, onto a metal rod, fire, and immersion in water.

Accompanying personnel conduct thorough independent inspections to ensure that spent fuel containers comply with the design standards and test conditions indicated in the regulations. Prior to any transport of spent fuel, the route plan provided by the carrier is reviewed and approved. The plan includes pre-arranged safe locations along the route, as well as arrangements with local law enforcement bodies for escort services.

Transport of Radioactive Materials by Sea, Road, Rail, and Air

Maritime transport is the most common method for large consignments of radioactive materials, such as spent fuel. Ships carrying such cargo undergo additional certification for fire safety and stability. France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States are the leaders in maritime transport.

Trucks with securely fastened containers, platforms for heavy assemblies (in the case of fuel), and vehicles equipped with restraint systems that prevent cargo movement are used for the transport of radioactive materials by road. For small-volume medical isotopes, standard vans or courier vehicles are often used, but packages are always certified and sealed. Radiation monitoring of the package is carried out both before departure and upon arrival. For high-level materials, escorting and GPS tracking may be used. Road vehicles should have proper markings and relevant documentation indicating the cargo, its activity, and package type. Vehicles for the transport of radioactive materials are used worldwide, but especially actively in Europe to carry medical isotopes between hospitals and production centers.

Rail transport is one of the primary methods for transporting radioactive materials over medium and long distances within continents. This applies to both nuclear fuel for NPPs and medical or industrial isotopes. Radioactive materials are transported in closed freight cars or flatcars, where the container is secured with fasteners. At every location where nuclear materials are received for transport or loaded onto a train, the carrier should inspect each railway car containing materials for proper marking, labels, secure closure, and container integrity. Each railway car is also checked for signs of unauthorized intrusion, such as seal integrity, presence of suspicious items, or items not belonging to the container. Railways are most often used to transport nuclear materials in France, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Ukraine.

Air transport of radioactive materials is used much less frequently, typically for small consignments of medical or scientific isotopes that have short half-lives and require rapid delivery. Passenger aircraft are only allowed to carry low-level radionuclides (e.g., for medical diagnostics). High-level materials are transported only by special charter flights with the involvement of governmental regulators. Canada leads in air transport as one of the largest producers of medical isotopes. Belgium and the Netherlands, which are the largest producers of molybdenum-99 for radiodiagnostics, are among the top three leaders.

Safety of Radioactive Material Transport in Ukraine

In Ukraine, the safety of radioactive material transport is regulated by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), which ensures the implementation of legislative initiatives, development of regulatory documents, issuance of authorizing documents (licenses for activities related to the transport of radioactive materials, permits for international transport of radioactive materials, and certificates of approval for the transport of radioactive materials), as well as the conduct of state oversight measures to ensure compliance with nuclear and radiation safety requirements.

In the very first years of its independence, Ukraine acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and undertook to meet all physical protection requirements. The classification and requirements for physical protection levels established by the Convention were implemented by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers [3] as mandatory not only for international but also for domestic transport. The basic regulatory document governing safety requirements, powers of participants, and other aspects of the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials is the Law of Ukraine “On Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety” [2]. This law also establishes the main requirements for physical protection during any activities involving nuclear materials, including transport. The Law of Ukraine “On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste, and Other Radiation Sources” [4] determines the objectives of physical protection during transport and the tasks of the physical protection system for transport. Requirements for the physical protection level of nuclear materials are presented in the Physical Protection Rules for Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Materials [5] for all categories of nuclear materials and for shipment by all modes of transport.

The main tool for ensuring an adequate level of physical protection for a specific shipment is the establishment of a physical protection system — a set of engineering, technical, organizational, and legal measures, including the provision of security and continuous monitoring of the transport process. The procedure for the establishment and operation of the physical protection system, duties and responsibilities of transport participants, and the requirements for vehicles are defined in the General Requirements for Physical Protection Systems of Nuclear Materials during Their Transport [6].

Physical protection is the core activities in ensuring the security of radioactive materials and has always been one of the top priorities in the transport of radioactive materials. However, the threats arising from the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the russian federation, seizure of the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs, as well as military operations on their territories have posed new challenges that require new approaches and new means. Currently, experts from the SNRIU and the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS), with the support of the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA), are working to improve regulatory requirements for the safety of radioactive material transport under wartime risks. Under the Conveyance project, experts are developing a set of documents, in particular the Recommended Approach to State Regulation of Activities Related to the Transport of Radioactive Materials, including Radiation Sources, under Wartime Risks and Recommended Procedure for Activities Related to the Transport of Radioactive Materials, including Radiation Sources, under Wartime Risks. These documents will provide the necessary framework for safety regulation of radioactive material transport during wartime.

Currently, nuclear security, in addition to physical protection, includes threat assessment, protection of sensitive information, cybersecurity, and the prevention of illicit trafficking for nuclear and other radioactive materials. These nuclear security measures applied to radioactive materials in transport and their transfer across the state border will contribute to improving the nuclear and radiation safety of radioactive material transport. They were introduced by the General Provisions on Nuclear Security of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste, and Other Radiation Sources [7] last year.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, fresh nuclear fuel was transported through Ukraine to Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. In the opposite direction, spent nuclear fuel from these countries was transported to russia, also in transit through Ukrainian territory. In addition to rail transport, the transit of radioactive materials was conducted by maritime and river transport along the Danube. In 2012, when highly enriched nuclear materials, including uranium and plutonium, was transported from Ukraine, it was carried by air.

As a result of the introduction of martial law in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it became necessary to revise the customary routes for transporting radioactive materials. New logistics chains were established in order to ensure the uninterrupted operation of NPPs, healthcare institutions, and other enterprises. The main priority in state safety regulation of radioactive material transport by the SNRIU was the principle of justification, as provided for by the Basic Radiation Safety Rules of Ukraine (OSPU-2005), with regard to each specific shipment, taking into account the actual risks and implementing appropriate measures to ensure radiation safety [8].

“Due to the hostilities, there is currently no transit of nuclear materials through Ukraine. It should be noted that spent nuclear fuel is significantly more hazardous than fresh fuel, since it belongs to a different category. In general, any nuclear material that has even been inside a reactor is already subject to a different, higher level of safety requirements,” Ihor Kuzmiak, Senior Researcher of the SSTC NRS Nuclear Security Laboratory says.

Domestic transport of radioactive materials is now carried out under the escort by representatives of the National Guard of Ukraine. Fresh fuel is delivered to NPPs while spent fuel is transported from the plants to the Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility. In addition, medical isotopes (Tc-99m, I-131, etc.), industrial sources for non-destructive testing, and samples for laboratory studies are regularly transported by road within Ukraine.

According to IAEA estimates, millions of radioactive material consignments are transported worldwide each year. However, there have been cases when radioactive materials were lost, transport containers were of inadequate quality, or human error has led to the threat of radiation release. Due to implementing strict safety standards, certification of containers for the transport of radioactive materials, control of transport conditions, and multi-level regulatory oversight, incidents leading to radiation release or accidents are extremely rare. This helps to understand why international transport standards are extremely strict.

Uatom.org Editorial Board

References:

1. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/274/Rev.1, IAEA, Vienna (1980), 12 pages.
2. Law of Ukraine “On Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety”
3. Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On Approval of the Procedure for Determining the Physical Protection Level for Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste, and Other Radiation Sources According to Their Category” No. 625 dated 26 April 2003
4. Law of Ukraine “On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste, and Other Radiation Sources” No. 2064-III. Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2001, No. 1, Article 1
5. Physical Protection Rules for Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Materials. Approved by SNRCU Order No. 116 dated 4 August 2006 and registered with the Ministry of Justice on 21 September 2006 under No. 1067/12941.
6. General Requirements for Physical Protection Systems of Nuclear Materials during Transport (NP 306.8.147-2008). Approved by SNRCU Order No. 156 dated 28 August 2008 and registered with the Ministry of Justice on 21 October 2008 under No. 1000/15691.
7. General Provisions for Nuclear Security of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste, and Other Radiation Sources. Approved by SNRIU Order No. 1071 dated 27 September 2024 and registered with the Ministry of Justice on 21 October 2008 under No. 1000/15691.
8. Report on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Ukraine in 2024. Kyiv, 2025, 112 pages
9. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency Involving the Transport of Radioactive Material. IAEA Safety Standards Series. International Atomic Energy Agency, 2022, 110