Nuclear Arms Reduction Era Seems to Have Come to the End
On 16 June, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published its annual assessment of armaments, disarmament, and international security.
As of January 2025, the total number of nuclear warheads was 12,241, of which 9,614 were considered potentially operational. Approximately 3,912 of these warheads were deployed on missiles and aircrafts, while the rest ones were in central storage. Around 2,100 deployed warheads were kept in a state of high operational readiness on ballistic missiles. Nearly all of these warheads belonged to russia or the United States, although China may also store some warheads on missiles.
The number of operational warheads of russia and the United States remained relatively stable in 2024. However, the both countries are implementing large-scale modernization programs that could increase the size and diversity of their arsenals in the future. Unless a new agreement is reached to limit their stockpiles, the number of warheads deployed on strategic missiles is likely to rise after the expiration of the bilateral Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty) in February 2026.
According to SIPRI estimates, China currently possesses at least 600 nuclear warheads. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing faster than that of any other country, with an increase of approximately 100 new warheads per year since 2023. By January 2025, China had completed or nearly completed the construction of around 350 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos in three major desert regions in the north of the country and three mountainous areas in the east. Depending on how China chooses to structure its armed forces, it could have at least as many ICBMs as russia or the United States by the end of the decade.
Although the United Kingdom did not increase its nuclear arsenal in 2024, its growth is expected in the future following the 2023 Integrated Security Review update, which reaffirmed earlier plans to raise the maximum number of warheads. During the election campaign, the Labour Party government elected in July 2024 expressed its commitment to continue the construction of four new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, to maintain the UK’s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent, and to carry out all necessary future modernizations of the UK’s nuclear arsenal in the future.
In 2024, France continued to implement the programs for the development of third-generation ballistic missile submarines and new air-launched cruise missiles, as well as for the upgrade and modernization of the operating systems, including the improved ballistic missile with new warhead modification.
India slightly expanded its nuclear arsenal in 2024 and continued to develop new types of the nuclear weapon delivery systems. India’s new “canistered” missiles, which can be transported with warheads installed, are likely capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and once operational, even multiple warheads on each missile.
Pakistan also continued to develop new delivery systems and accumulate fissile material in 2024, indicating that its nuclear arsenal could expand over the next decade.
North Korea continues to consider its military nuclear program as a key element of the national security strategy. According to SIPRI estimates, the country has currently accumulated about 50 warheads, has enough fissile material to produce another 40 warheads, and is accelerating the production of new one. In July 2024, South Korean officials warned that North Korea was in the “final stages” of developing “tactical nuclear weapons”.
Israel does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons, but researchers believe that the country is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal. In 2024, the country tested a rocket engine that may be related to the Jericho family of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. In addition, Israel appears to be modernizing its plutonium production facility at the nuclear reactor in Dimona.
According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2025, the era of nuclear arms reduction appears to have come to the end. The approaching expiration of the bilateral Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty) in February 2026, as well as arguments in the US in favor of strengthening deterrence to counter China’s nuclear arsenal expansion increase the likelihood of unregulated nuclear arms buildup in the future. The resumption of national debates in Europe, in the Middle East and East Asia on nuclear status and strategy indicates the potential for new members to join the “Nuclear Club”.
Everything indicates that a new qualitative nuclear arms race is beginning, and compared to the previous one, its risks will be more diverse and serious. Among the key areas of competition are technological capabilities in cyberspace, outer space, and the maritime domain. Therefore, the idea of who is leading the race will become even more vague and intangible, and the old, predominantly quantitative formulas for arms control will no longer be sufficient or effective.
According to SIPRI