Step by Step to Disarmament: Why Ukraine Will Not Be Able to Restore Its Nuclear Status

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world was left on the territory of Ukraine. Under pressure of the international community, Ukraine renounced its nuclear status: Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum with the United States of America (USA), Great Britain and russia in 1994. Ukraine received security assurances, independence and territorial integrity in exchange for the removal of nuclear weapons and joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the assurances presented in the Budapest Memorandum have been violated, especially after the annexation of Crimea by russia in 2014.  

Ideas to restore the nuclear status of Ukraine emerged first after the Ukraine-russia conflict over the Tuzla Island in 2003. The discussions of these ideas and speculations about this topic were intensified in 2014 after russian aggression and annexation of Crimea. For example, on 3 July 2014, People’s Deputies of Ukraine representing the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda (TN: Ukrainian for “Freedom”) registered a draft Resolution in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Restoring the Nuclear Status of Ukraine. A similar draft was submitted by representatives of the Oleh Liashko Radical Party. The paragraph on restoring Ukraine’s nuclear status is also included in the Program of the Natsionalnyi Korpus (TN: Ukrainian for the “National Corps”).

The need for revision of the non-nuclear status of our country became urgent after the start of russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The war has shown the vulnerability of countries that once voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons in exchange for international security assurances. Despite the signed promises to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, russia became the aggressor and has occupied Ukrainian territories since 2014. During the war, its officials have repeatedly openly threatened to use nuclear weapons not only against Ukraine, but also as a way to put pressure on the whole civilized world. As one of the countries that assured security under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, russia violated not only its commitments, but also the main principles of international law presented in the United Nations (UN) Charter. It challenges the efficiency of the current system for protection of non-nuclear states.

In addition, the idea to reconsider the non-nuclear status of Ukraine is supported by the majority of Ukrainians, although this was unthinkable ten years ago. This this evidenced by the survey held by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology at the end of 2024, according to which 73 % of respondents support the idea of restoring nuclear weapons, 20 % do not support this idea and 7 % are uncertain regarding the issue. 

In view of the growing support of the idea to restore nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Uatom.org Editorial Board decided to explain what the nuclear non-proliferation means, why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons and why restoring the nuclear status is not possible in the future.

What Does the Nuclear Status Mean?

The concept of nuclear status is often mentioned in public discourse, especially in the context of security challenges faced by Ukraine. However, before discussing its possible restoration, it is important to clarify what is exactly meant by this term.

There is no clear and universally recognized definition of the term “nuclear status” in international law. At the same time, the term “non-nuclear status” is mentioned in a number of international documents and agreements, in particular, in the NPT.

The notion of nuclear status is usually used in the public and media space as a synonym for possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, countries possessing nuclear warheads are conventionally classified as nuclear states, and those without are non-nuclear states.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: How It Started?

The nuclear era began in 1945, when the USA became the first state to test nuclear weapons and the first and only state to use them. The USSR was the next after the USA to test the first nuclear explosive device in 1949. In 1952, nuclear weapons were created in the Great Britain. It was 1960 for France and 1964 for China.

It seemed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be the same as for any other new type of weapons, since many countries started their own nuclear programs, in particular, Australia, Egypt, Switzerland and Sweden. However, the situation began to change at the turn of 1950s-1960s. There appeared an understanding of the destructive force of nuclear weapons and its consequences. Anti-nuclear organizations were created all over the world. The considerate anti-nuclear public movements were intensifying. At the same time, the costs of developing nuclear weapons made them unaffordable for most countries, and the states that already possessed nuclear weapons were interested in maintaining their monopoly and preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.

More countries showed their readiness to give up nuclear ambitions provided the provision of international security assurances, in particular, assuring of the non-nuclear status of neighboring and potentially hostile countries. However, nuclear states did not consider elimination of their arsenals in the short-term perspective, considering complete nuclear disarmament as a distant goal. Therefore, the world faced a paradoxical situation between the desire of the majority of countries to ban nuclear weapons and interests of the nuclear states.

The solution was found in the NPT, according to which five states were officially recognized to possess nuclear weapons: USA, Great Britain, USSR (with russia as a successor), France and China. These countries were obliged not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives to other states and not to assist or encourage them to acquire such weapons in any way.

At the same time, the rest of countries voluntarily gave up the intention of acquiring nuclear weapons and committed not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as not to seek assistance and not to receive assistance in producing such weapons. In addition, non-nuclear states were obliged to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement to verify the fulfilment of the commitments identified in the NPT. 

As of 2025, the NPT has 191 Member States, including five officially recognized nuclear states. India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT, although they possess nuclear weapons. Israel has not signed the NPT and officially has not confirmed the possession of nuclear weapons, but researchers consider that this state also has a nuclear arsenal and keeps modernizing it. The North Korea (DPRK) joined the NPT in 1985 but announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Since that time, the state has held several nuclear tests and declared the possession of nuclear weapons.

Iraq joined the NPT in 1969 as a non-nuclear state. However, Saddam Hussein’s regime secretly tried to develop a nuclear program with the potential of creating nuclear weapons in 1980s. After the Persian Gulf War (1991), UN inspectors revealed a large-scale secret program for producing nuclear weapons, which was a clear violation of the NPT. Today, Iraq is a member of the NPT and has no active nuclear program.

Iran became a member of the NPT in 1970 by committing not to develop nuclear weapons. However, the IAEA revealed evidence of secret activities in the early 2000, since some nuclear facilities and programs have not been declared. Currently, Iran is enriching uranium to 60 %, which is close to the level necessary to produce nuclear weapons.

What does nuclear non-proliferation include?

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is a set of international agreements, organizational structures and national legislation of Member States aimed at preventing the acquisition of nuclear status by countries that did not possess nuclear weapons before 1967. 

All nuclear explosive devices, as well as materials, equipment and technologies needed for their production regardless of declared military or peaceful purpose are subject to regulation.

The functioning of the regime envisages:

• preservation on the non-nuclear status of states that did not have nuclear weapons before 1967;
• ban on the transfer of nuclear explosive devices, materials, equipment and technologies to third countries;
• commitment of non-nuclear states to keep from obtaining such elements by any means;
• participation of non-nuclear states in negotiations aimed at termination of nuclear arms race and gradual nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, the notion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons envisages a set of measures aimed at preventing dissemination of nuclear weapons and preserving obligations of states that have refused to acquire it.

Reasons for Ukraine to Give Up Nuclear Weapons 

The contribution of Ukraine to the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime is unique, because it gave up its nuclear arsenal, which was even more powerful than the arsenals of the Great Britain, China and France combined.

As of the moment of the USSR collapse, Ukraine possessed:

• 220 strategic delivery vehicles: 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, including 130 liquid propellant UR-100N (SS-19 Stiletto) (six warheads each) and 46 solid-propellant RT-23UTTh (SS-24 Scalpel) (ten warheads each) in silo-launched vehicles;
• strategic bombers Tu-95MS and Tu-160 (from 30 to 40);
• strategical nuclear warheads: from 1,514 to 2,156;
• tactical nuclear warheads: from 2,800 to 4,200.

The issue of Ukraine’s giving up its nuclear arsenal has been repeatedly analyzed and discussed by both direct participants of the political decision-making process and experts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In addition, thorough analysis of historical references and political processes state on significant external pressure on Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons. Similar pressure was also exerted on other post-Soviet states, including Belarus and Kazakhstan. It is hardly a surprise that the fate of the general global nuclear security regime and the NPT depended on these decisions.

This conclusion was confirmed by analytical materials of the American researcher Stephen F. Burgess, who stated that “aside from established political regimes, states with transient political systems, like the South African Republic, demonstrate increased sensitivity to external and internal pressure aimed at ensuring the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime” during the analysis of the process of South African Republic nuclear disarmament in 1991.

The systemic diplomatic pressure exerted on Ukraine during its nuclear disarmament is also discussed in the article by American researcher George E. Bogden “Deceit, Dread, and Disbelief: The Story of How Ukraine Lost Its Nuclear Arsenal” published in the National Interest in October 2023. Based on previously unpublished archival materials, internal memoranda and evidences of the participants in the negotiations, the author highlighted little-known facts and mechanisms of foreign-policy pressure on Kyiv by the leading Western states.

In particular, George E. Bogden said that the USA supported by the NATO consistently and purposefully demanded that Ukraine transfer its nuclear arsenal to russia, despite the increasing geopolitical threat posed by russia itself. U.S. officials not only blocked Ukrainian attempts to exchange its inherited arsenal for real security assurances but also lobbied Europeans to keep Ukraine from security agreements outside the NATO. 

Thus, Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons not voluntarily, but under significant external pressure. First, it was required for Ukraine to become sovereign state and so that its independent status to be recognized by the whole world. This was stated by Professor Volodymyr Vasylenko, a direct participant of those events, a prominent Ukrainian diplomat, former representative of Ukraine to the EU and the NATO. He reminded that back in 1990, James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, named “non-possession of nuclear weapons” among the main criteria that the USA together with the rest of the Western world would keep in recognizing newly independent states.

Second, in the early 1990s, Ukraine faced a deep social and economic crisis: budget deficit, rapidly falling gross domestic product, rising inflation and mass unemployment. The problem of energy dependence on russia was very acute. Ukraine did not possess a full cycle of nuclear fuel production and was forced to purchase it abroad. As a compensation for nuclear potential, Ukraine received about 1 billion USD in fuel for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Besides, the state also had large debts for natural gas supplies, which led to regular blackouts in different regions. Part of the debt for russian gas was written off as a result of bilateral agreements: russia paid 275 million USD for 11 strategic bombers TU-160 and TU-95MS, 575 cruise missiles X-55 and other equipment.

Third, Academician Volodymyr Horbulin, who was directly involved in the decision-making process regarding strategic nuclear disarmament, focused on a set of critical technical problems that occurred after the collapse of the USSR. In particular, it was the absence of proper maintenance and termination of warranties for operation of nuclear weapons that remained in Ukraine. The researcher stated that nuclear charges have limited life for safe functioning, after which they lose stability and can become a source of high-level radioactive waste. At that time, Ukraine did not have its own technological capacities for maintenance or regeneration of warheads. The creation of a relevant infrastructure required significant finances and time, while the deficits had already been obvious: as of the moment of considering the issue of nuclear disarmament, there was a critical increase in the temperature regime of some warheads, which posed a potential threat of a nuclear incident.

Serhii Kondratov, Senior Researcher of the Department of Critical Infrastructure, Energy and Environmental Safety of the Center for Security Studies of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, among other reasons for Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons named the following:

• absence of possibilities to manage nuclear missile systems in Ukraine;

• nuclear weapons were designed and produced in russia, and their installation and maintenance were performed by experts of the special administration of the former Ministry of Defense of the USSR, which had no departments in Ukraine;
• lack of finances to create own facilities to regenerate nuclear warheads;
• need for retargeting of nuclear weapons for nuclear deterrence if there are polarized views in Ukrainian society on the choice of the geopolitical vector in the development of the country;
• serious anti-nuclear views in Ukrainian society, largely caused by the accident at Chornobyl NPP.

Therefore, in the early 1990s, this decision was the only possible for national and international interests of Ukraine.

Step by Step to the Disarmament

“The Ukrainian SSR solemnly declares its intention to become a permanently neutral state in the future, not participating in military alliances and adhering to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons”. 

The Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR declared this in the Declaration of State Sovereignty in 1990.

Two months after the declaration of independence of Ukraine, on 24 October 1991, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a statement on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine, which outlined the conditions for providing international security assurances, receiving financial compensation (in particular, for uranium and warheads) and participating in peaceful nuclear cooperation (through the IAEA). 

The first practical step to the implementation of nuclear disarmament was the complete transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to russia during the period from January to May 1992.

The next step was to sign the Trilateral Agreement between Ukraine, russia and the USA on 15 January 1994 in Moscow. It envisaged the transfer of strategical nuclear weapons to russia, compensation to Ukraine in the form of nuclear fuel in exchange for transferred enriched uranium, participation of the USA in financing of the elimination of the arms infrastructure within the Nunn-Lugar Program.

The Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Budapest Memorandum) was the most significant document and historical event. It was signed on 5 December 1994 in Budapest at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summit with the participation of three nuclear states: British Prime Minister John Major, russian President Borys Yeltsin, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Similar international documents were signed on the same day by Belarus and Kazakhstan, on the territories of which there still remained nuclear weapons from the former USSR.

This document outlines the following key assurances:

• respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine;
• refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine;
• refrain from economic pressure aimed at subordinating to their own interests the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thereby obtaining any advantages;
• assist Ukraine as NPT Member State not possessing nuclear weapons in the case that Ukraine becomes a victim of an act of aggression or the object of a threat of aggression with the use of nuclear weapons;
• not to use nuclear weapons against any NPT Member States not possessing nuclear weapons;
• consult in case of a situation that raises questions with regard to these commitments.

It shall be stated that France and China did not join the Budapest Memorandum as the Parties, explaining that the mechanisms of safety assurances are already laid down in the UN Charter and in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975. They issued separate unilateral statements of a declarative nature, which did not impose any clearly determined obligations.

By 1996, Ukraine had completed full transfer of strategic warheads to russia. During the next five years, under the technical support of the USA, launch silos were completely eliminated, weapon delivery equipment was destroyed and military infrastructure was dismantled. On 30 August 2001, the last launch silo for intercontinental ballistic missile in the Pidhaitsi Village in the Poltava Region was destroyed.

In the new decade, Ukraine continued the policy of strengthening global nuclear security. During the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, Ukraine announced its decision to give up all available stocks of highly enriched uranium that remained in research and development institutions. Ukraine fulfilled its obligations on 22 March 2012 through ensuring the transfer of the last batch of highly enriched nuclear materials from the National Science Center “Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology” (NSC KIPT) to russia with the assistance of the USA and the IAEA. Six secret operations were conducted during two years to retrieve 234 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Ukrainian research centers: Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research, NSC KIPT and Sevastopol University. In return, Ukraine received an equivalent amount of low-enriched uranium and U.S. funding for the implementation of the project on the construction of the Nuclear Subcritical Assembly “Neutron Source” at NSC KIPT.

As a summary, Ukraine has never had an officially recognized nuclear status within the NPT. After signing and ratifying the NPT in 1994, it joined it as a non-nuclear state. Therefore, according to the international law, Ukraine cannot restore its nuclear status it never formally had. The only way is to violate committed obligations.

Violation of the Budapest Memorandum

The inability to implement the Budapest Memorandum, in particular, the consultation mechanism envisaged by paragraph six, was revealed in 2003 during the border conflict between Ukraine and russia over the Tuzla Island. At that time, russia unilaterally started the construction of an artificial dam from the krasnodar shores towards the Ukrainian Tuzla Island, which administratively belonged to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Ukraine considered these actions as violation of its territorial integrity and an attempt to change the border in the Kerch Strait.

In response to the escalation, Ukraine tried to involve the consultation mechanism envisaged by the Budapest Memorandum. However, all three guarantor states (USA, Great Britain, russia) ignored Ukraine’s request avoiding any official involvement in multilateral consultations in the envisaged format. As a result, there was a temporary termination in the construction of a dam upon bilateral negotiations between Kyiv and moscow. However, there was no involvement of the Budapest Memorandum guarantors. At the same time, these events became a prerequisite for russia’s further actions, in particular, the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

When Viktor Yushchenko was the President of Ukraine (2005-2010), Ukraine repeatedly tried to initiate a review and strengthening of security assurances provided under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 through giving them a clear legal status. However, all these efforts did not have expected results and remained at the level of political statements and diplomatic appeals.

Peculiar attention to this issue was paid in late 2009 in the context of the termination of the Bilateral Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START 1) signed in 1991 and valid till December 2009. At that time, the president of russia dmitrii medvedev and the U.S. President Barack Obama issued a joint statement to reaffirm safety assurances of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as states that gave up nuclear weapons and joined the NPT in the status of non-nuclear states. The document stated the importance to comply with provisions of the Budapest Memorandum and to keep to commitments to the non-use of force, refraining from nuclear pressure and supporting the territorial integrity of these states. However, despite these diplomatic assurances, there were no real mechanisms for strengthening or updating the security assurances. The security assurances provided to Ukraine in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons remained purely political promises that had neither legal force nor implementation mechanisms.

At the end of February 2014, russian troops invaded the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and cynically violated their own commitments presented in the Budapest Memorandum. The paradox is that Ukraine’s territorial integrity was violated by the guarantor of its territorial integrity. Moreover, the aggression was posed by the state possessing nuclear weapons.

The international community has recognized the fact of violation of Budapest Memorandum provisions regarding Ukraine. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, stated this in his speech during the Hague Nuclear Security Summit held on 24 March 2014 and focused on the fact that safety assurances were an important condition for Ukraine joining the NPT, but their reliability was seriously challenged by the events around Ukraine. The UN Secretary General expressed the opinion that this would have negative consequences for both regional security and the entire nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime.

Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine and Non-Proliferation Regime

After the beginning of russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has faced the most serious challenges since its implementation. For the first time in history, one of the nuclear states and the guarantor under the NPT and the Budapest Memorandum, started a full-scale war against the non-nuclear state that voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal relying on international security assurances.

On the first day of the full-scale invasion, russian troops occupied Chornobyl NPP. The personnel of the NPP were taken hostages. During the occupation:

• control over radiation safety at the NPP and in the Exclusion Zone was lost;
• the NPP faced complete station blackout, which resulted in loss of cooling of spent fuel assemblies located at the spent fuel storage facility;
• there were massive cases of looting and destruction of the infrastructure: Central Analytical Laboratory, State Specialized Enterprise “Ecocenter” (SSE Ecocenter), Institute for Safety Problems of Nuclear Power Plants, physical protection systems of the Vector Site;
• 133 radiation sources with a total activity of more than 7 million Becquerels were stolen and damaged;
• radiation sources and samples of fuel-containing materials from the Shelter were also stolen from the laboratories of the Institute for Safety Problems of Nuclear Power Plants.

The Nuclear Subcritical Assembly “Neutron Source” was repeatedly attacked. On 4 March 2022, russian troops occupied the Zaporizhzhia NPP that is the largest NPP in Europe. During the seizure and following hostilities, Zaporizhzhia NPP industrial site suffered from artillery shelling, the reactor building of Unit 1 was damaged, and the Dry Spent Fuel Storage Facility was attacked. A fire caused by shelling of Zaporizhzhia NPP industrial site damaged the building of the training center. Russian troops stored explosives, heavy weapons and troops directly on the territory of the NPP, turning it into a military base, which is the direct violation of international humanitarian and nuclear law.  

For more than three years, Zaporizhzhia NPP and its satellite city Enerhodar have been under russian occupation. NPP personnel have been working under pressure. The IAEA and the Ukrainian side have no full access to the facility, which makes it impossible to perform comprehensive safety review. Heavy weapons, explosives are stored and russian military contingent is present on the territory of Zaporizhzhia NPP. In fact, russian occupation of the NPP challenges the fundamentals of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is a basic principle of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, russian officials together with vladimir putin have resorted to nuclear blackmail. On the fourth day of the war, putin ordered to put russian strategic deterrence forces on special combat alert, which actually meant putting the nuclear forces on high alert mode. With this statement, russian president recognized the possibility of using nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine. There have been repeated threats of a nuclear strike on the territory of Ukraine. In 2023, russia announced the placement of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, creating a new point of instability in the center of Europe. Besides, in February 2023, russia suspended its participation in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III).

Therefore, russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has become an unprecedented challenge to the world nuclear non-proliferation regime. Ukraine, which voluntarily gave up the world third largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for written and oral safety assurances, faced the armed aggression from one of the guarantor states. At the same time, nuclear facilities became the battleground and peaceful nuclear facilities became the targets for shelling.

The most cynical fact is that russia attacked Ukrainian civil infrastructure and peaceful people using strategic bombers Tu-160 and Tu-95MS, which Ukraine transferred to russia back in 1996 within the agreements on the final abandonment of its nuclear arsenal. These airplanes were a part of Ukrainian heritage from the Soviet nuclear arsenal and were transferred in exchange for international security assurances that were aimed at guaranteeing Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, one of the guarantors violated its commitments and subsequently used these airplanes as a means of armed aggression against Ukraine.

That is the reason why the operation of the Security Service of Ukraine “Pavutyna” (TN: Ukrainian for “Spider’s Web”), which caused destruction of the significant part of russian strategic aviation, in particular, nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, is not only of military but also global security importance. With this powerful operation dealing with the aviation component of russia’s nuclear triad, Ukraine significantly limited russian ability to launch an airborne nuclear strike.

Thus, Ukraine made an important contribution into weakening of the global nuclear threat and protecting the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Ukraine confirmed its responsible position as a state that even in wartime sticks to the principles of international security and international law.

Conclusions

The idea of providing Ukraine with the nuclear status is being discussed more and more in the public and political discourse, especially after the beginning of russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A part of society recognizes this idea as a way to restore justice, taking into account the historical fact that Ukraine had a nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the USSR. However, the war unleashed by russia, which is accompanied by massive civilian casualties, has revealed the ineffectiveness of the security assurances provided to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum. This document aimed at protecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state borders in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons does not fulfil its obligations.

Together with this, it should be stated that providing Ukraine with the nuclear status is rather unlikely and almost impossible because of international commitments of the state and in the view of potential political, economical and security consequences of such a step.

According to the publications by Professor Volodymyr Vasylenko, Academician Volodymyr Horbulin, Senior Researcher of the National Institute of Strategic Studies Serhii Kondratov, American Researcher George E. Bogden,  there are three main reasons making it impossible to restore the nuclear status of Ukraine.

First, Ukraine is a party to the NPT and withdrawal from it can lead to political isolation, imposing of sanctions and loss of international support. Such a step would be considered not only as a threat to regional security, but also as undermining of the global non-nuclear regime. 

Second, the absence of necessary technical, production and scientific infrastructure would make the production of own nuclear weapons rather a difficult task. Ukraine lost not only the control over nuclear warheads but also eliminated all nuclear infrastructure.

Third, implementation of the nuclear program would require large investments, time and experts, which are currently not available.

Therefore, the idea of restoring the nuclear status is emotionally understandable in wartime, but it does not comply either with strategic or practical interests of Ukraine.

Uatom.org Editorial Board