War in Ukraine: Current Threats to Radiation and Nuclear Safety of the Country

Following the impact of a russian drone on the NSC Arch, thermal imaging monitoring of the NSC condition continues, including the use of UAVs. The relocation of operational fire extinguishing lines is underway. The required forces and resources of the SESU, including climber teams, are engaged. The SESU reserve personnel remain on standby.

Following the impact of a russian drone on the NSC Arch, efforts continue, including UAV-assisted detection and suppression of smoldering hotspots, as well as partial opening of structures. Seven operational fire suppression lines have been installed along the NSC Arch cladding to extinguish smoldering hotspots. The necessary SESU forces and resources, including climber teams, are involved. The SESU reserve personnel remain on standby. No deterioration in radiation conditions at the NSC–Shelter industrial site or Chornobyl NPP has been recorded. No radioactive release beyond established limits has been detected.

At present, the water level in the cooling pond of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains unchanged at 14.12 m.

As of 19:00, efforts to contain and eliminate smoldering hotspots are ongoing: one hotspot is being extinguished at the NSC; partial opening of structures continues; thermal imaging aerial monitoring of the NSC perimeter is being conducted using three UAVs; six operational fire suppression lines have been installed on the NSC Arch. A total of three climber teams (nine people) are working, with 16 people in reserve, supported by 22 units of equipment and 100 SESU employees.

The safe operational conditions of the NSC–Shelter were compromised due to damage sustained by the external and internal NSC Arch cladding and the main crane system equipment. An extraordinary inspection recorded the following damage:

• external Arch cladding: localized perforations, localized cladding defects without full structural failure, damage to internal insulation, destruction of bolted connections;
• maintenance structures: deformation of connection joints in the upper section of the maintenance garage;
• damage to sealing membranes of the NSC enclosure system in the southern, southwestern, and southeastern zones;
• a total of 153 holes have been drilled to facilitate fire suppression efforts.

The radiation background at the NSC–Shelter industrial site and Chornobyl NPP remains within normal limits. No radioactive release beyond established limits has been detected.

According to the IAEA, as a result of military operations, the only 330-kilovolt (kV) backup power line was disconnected on 11 February and has not yet been fully restored. This leaves Zaporizhzhia NPP, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, entirely dependent on the only remaining 750-kV transmission line.

As of 07:00, firefighting efforts continue following the russian drone strike on the NSC Arch. The following damage was identified during the NSC Arch inspection:

• external Arch cladding: through perforations covering an area of approximately 15 m², cladding defects, damage to internal insulation, and destruction of bolted connections;
• load-bearing structures of the maintenance garage: deformation of connection joints in the upper section of the maintenance garage structures.

The radiation background remains under continuous monitoring, with fluctuations staying within typical limits at all measurement points.

As of 16:00, response efforts are ongoing to mitigate the consequences of the fire caused by the russian drone strike on the NSC Arch. Three smoldering hotspots have been identified. Climber teams are engaged in partial opening of the Shelter structures and extinguishing the hotspots. No deterioration in radiation conditions has been recorded at the NSC–Shelter industrial site or at Chornobyl NPP as a whole. No radioactive release beyond established limits has been detected.

As of 19:00, firefighting operations continue on the NSC Arch external cladding. Three fire suppression nozzles are in operation to extinguish flames and subsequently soak the insulation and membrane. Climber teams are carrying out partial opening of the NSC Arch structures and filling voids under the roof with fire suppression agents. UAVs equipped with thermal imaging cameras are being used for monitoring. A total of 18 units of equipment and 85 SESU employees are engaged at the site.

The safe operational limits and conditions of the NSC–Shelter have been compromised due to damage to the external and internal cladding of the NSC Arch and equipment of the main crane system. An unscheduled inspection of the NSC Arch containment and load-bearing structures, as well as the main crane system maintenance garage, revealed the following damage:

• external Arch cladding: through perforations covering an area of approximately 15 m², cladding defects without total structural failure spanning up to 200 m²;
• damage to internal insulation;
• destruction of bolted connections;
• load-bearing structures of the maintenance garage: deformation of connection joints in the upper section of the garage structures.

No deterioration in radiation background has been recorded at the NSC–Shelter industrial site or at Chornobyl NPP as a whole. No radioactive release beyond established limits has been detected.

As of 16:00, fire extinguishing operations continue on the NSC Arch external cladding filler. Three fire suppression nozzles are in operation at a height of 87 m, followed by soaking of the insulation and membrane. Climbers are engaged in partial opening of the NSC Arch structures and filling voids with fire suppression agents under the roof of the building. A total of 20 units of equipment and 84 SESU employees are involved at the site. No deterioration in the radiation background at the NSC–Shelter industrial site and Chornobyl NPP as a whole has been recorded. No radioactive release beyond the established limits has been detected.

As of 13:24, smoldering centers of the anti-radiation membrane (EPDM) have been confined over an area of 60 m², with partial extinguishing continuing over an area of 20 m². Real-time analysis is being conducted on the ambient dose equivalent rate of gamma radiation in the fire-affected area. The radiation background in the Exclusion Zone is continuously monitored through the Automated Radiation Monitoring System (ARMS) at 39 points. Data are transmitted to the control center every hour, and every minute in emergencies. Given the scale of the fire, personnel in the Exclusion Zone do not require additional radiation protection measures.

At 01:54, experts from the IAEA Permanent Monitoring Mission recorded a strike by a russian attack drone on the New Safe Confinement (NSC) of the Shelter above Unit 4 of the Chornobyl NPP, the site of the world’s worst man-made disaster in 1986. As a result of the strike and subsequent fire, the integrity of the NSC outer cladding and equipment in the crane maintenance garage was compromised. Fire suppression efforts and damage assessment are ongoing.

There were no casualties, and no radioactive release beyond the established limits has been recorded. At present, radiation background at the Chornobyl NPP industrial site and in the Exclusion Zone does not exceed the control levels. The response effort includes SESU forces and assets, with 65 employees and 17 units of equipment, as well as 15 representatives from the Chornobyl NPP, National Guard of Ukraine, National Police of Ukraine, and Security Service of Ukraine.

According to the IAEA, the only 330-kilovolt (kV) backup power line was disconnected as a result of military operations.

The IAEA mission in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone reported that at least two drones flew in close proximity to the industrial site.

IAEA experts reported a drone attack today on the training center of Zaporizhzhia NPP, directly outside the site perimeter. According to available information, there were no casualties or damage to NPP equipment.

According to Energoatom, russian occupiers attempted to repair the shunt reactor of the 750 kV Dniprovska power line at the ZNPP 750 kV open switchyard, which they had previously damaged. The repair began on 23 November, followed by two unsuccessful attempts to restore its operation, as both times the reactor was shut down by the longitudinal and transverse differential protection systems. All these actions were carried out by the occupiers without any coordination or authorization from Ukraine’s regional power grid control centers, in gross violation of regulatory and operational documentation. Such actions risk a complete loss of in-house power supply to the NPP, potentially leading to a nuclear or radiological accident.

As a result of military operations, the Neutron Source facility at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology was disconnected from the power grid. The facility operated on emergency diesel generators until power was restored approximately five hours later.

Cruise missiles were detected 3.7 kilometers from the Khmelnytsky NPP site, posing a direct threat to nuclear and radiation safety.

A russian drone attacked the IAEA vehicle driving to the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia NPP. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reported this on the X social network. According to him, during the 26th rotation of the IAEA support and assistance mission at ZNPP, one of the mission’s vehicles was targeted by a drone.

Seventeen drones were detected flying approximately three kilometers from the Pivdennoukrainsk Nuclear Power Plant.

At present, the water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia NPP remains at 14.12 m.

The Zaporizhzhia NPP lost connection with its only 750 kV power line twice over several days. The first disconnection occurred approximately 17 km from the plant and lasted over 30 hours, from the morning of 16 November until midday the next day, when repairs were completed and the connection was restored. This morning, the connection was lost again. As a result of these disconnections, the Zaporizhzhia NPP relied on its sole remaining 330 kV backup power line to supply electricity required for reactor cooling and other key nuclear safety functions.

russian dictator vladimir putin signed a decree approving an updated nuclear doctrine, expanding the list of threats that could prompt a nuclear response from russia. The document was published on russia’s legal information portal on 19 November.

The updated provisions introduce additional justifications for using nuclear weapons, including large-scale launches of drones, cruise missiles, aircraft, and other airborne systems crossing russia’s borders.

russian shelling damaged several Ukrainian electrical substations critical for nuclear plant operations, causing four major power lines to fail. Of Ukraine’s nine operational power units, only two are currently running at full power, while the remaining six have reduced output to between 40% and 90% of their maximum power.

The SNRIU informed the IAEA that the Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone was without power for approximately two hours, relying on emergency diesel generators during that time.

At present, the water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia NPP is 14.19 m.

A water leak occurred at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant from an impulse line representing a small pipe connected to the primary side of the power unit that is part of the reactor coolant pump support systems.

russia conducted exercises of the strategic nuclear forces with launches of various ballistic missiles. During the exercises, practical launches of the yars intercontinental ballistic missile were carried out from the plesetsk cosmodrome. The sineva ballistic missile was also launched from the waters of the barents sea and the bulava missile from the waters of the okhotsk sea. The exercises involved Tu-95MS long-range aircrafts that have launched air-based cruise missiles.

The SNRIU informed the IAEA that 12 drones flew near the Khmelnytskyi NPP in the morning, the closest of them was 400 meters away from it. The regulatory body also reported that drones have appeared three times over the past week near the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP site.

The Pivdennoukrainsk NPP Unit 1 was disconnected from the grid in the evening for about four hours due to a spurious signal to the unit protection systems, while the reactor safety systems have not been actuated.

One of the power lines that connected the temporarily occupied ZNPP with the unified energy system of Ukraine was disconnected for more than 26 hours at 12:18 PM as a result of enemy shelling by the russians.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.28 m.

The SNRIU informed the IAEA that three UAVs were recorded in the observation zone at the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP on 10 October, and five in the evening of 14 October.

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has restored connection to the 150 kV power line that was damaged in a shelling attack at the end of the last month, which has further limited the potential power availability for the ZNPP, as this line connects the site to the distribution point located next to the Zaporizhzhia thermal power plant.

russian shahids have again violated the no-fly zone around the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP. In the night of 7 October, two russian UAVs were recorded near the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP industrial site. The shahids’ flight distance from the nuclear facilities was less than 10 km.

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has lost connection with its only backup power line for 36 hours this week.

The SNRIU reported to the IAEA that five russian UAVs flew over the territory of the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP, including one of them right above the site.

The SNRIU reported to the IAEA that on the nights of 27 and 29 September, ten and thirteen drones flew over the territory of the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP twice, one of them flew right above the site.

Another unmanned strike vehicle was recorded at night at a critically low altitude near the Rivne NPP industrial site.

russia wants to amend the nuclear deterrence doctrine in order to allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks of non-nuclear states using conventional weapons.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.36 m.

According to Energoatom, an unmanned strike vehicle flying near the Khmelnytskyi NPP industrial site was recorded at night. The flight line indicates that russia was probably attempting to simulate an attack directly on the NPP by sharply deviating from the initial flight line toward the plant, approaching the site, and then turning around and returning to the initial flight line.

russia has failed new tests of the RS-28 sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile. An attempt by the russian nuclear deterrent forces to test the new intercontinental ballistic missile on 21 September 2024 ended in complete failure and fire at the launch site. Most likely, the missile’s liquid-fuel engine exploded when leaving the 15P728 launch silo. The explosion created a giant crater almost 62 meters wide, in which elements of the launch silo were visible.

A probable drone strike occurred at the ZNPP on a 35/6 kilovolt (kV) substation approximately 300 meters away from the plant. This substation supplies power to ZNPP facilities not related to safety, including the network water pumping station, water treatment station and external warehouses. The IAEA mission visited the affected facility the next day and observed some impact on one of two substation transformers. The remains of batteries and metal parts of a probable drone were found on the territory.

The SNRIU reported to the IAEA that the Neutron Source located in the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology came under fire, but was not damaged.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.45 m.

Three days later, Ukrainian power engineers restored operation of the second damaged power line. Thus, power supply to the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP from the Ukrainian power system via two lines was restored.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.51 m.

russian shelling has damaged one of two external overhead lines that allows the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP to receive power from the Ukrainian power system for auxiliary power supply.

The russian federation carried out a massive missile and drone attack on the critical infrastructure and energy sector facilities in Ukraine with the aim of paralyzing the operation of Ukraine’s energy generating facilities.

Rivne NPP Units 1, 3 and 4 were disconnected from the grid at 08:58 AM as a result of the attack. At 09:05 AM, the capacity of the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP units was reduced to the total level of 1,800 MW.

Due to fluctuations in the unified energy system caused by the russian attack, PNPP Unit 3 was disconnected from the grid at 05:10 PM.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.59 m.

russian shelling damaged the external overhead line that allowed the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP to receive power from the Ukrainian power system for auxiliary power supply.

The Zaporizhzhia NPP is currently connected to the Ukrainian power system by only one power line.

A drone equipped with explosives hit the road along the perimeter of the Zaporizhzhia NPP site. The explosives detonated beyond the NPP strict access area. The blast site was near the main cooling ponds and approximately 100 meters away from the Dnipro power line that is the only 750 kilovolt (kV) line supplying power to the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

At about 08:00 PM, a fire broke out at the service water supply facility on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. As a result of this event, cooling tower No. 1 located approximately one kilometer away from NPP units caught fire, and the internal components were damaged at the level of water nozzle distribution.

russian artillery struck the local power and water supply substation in the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most of Zaporizhzhia NPP personnel live. Two transformers failed as a result of shelling, causing blackout in the entire town.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.75 m.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.86 m.

The IAEA mission at the Zaporizhzhia NPP reported damage to the regional substation as a result of a military strike, which led to a blackout in Enerhodar and also affected water supply, particularly, there was no tap water in some buildings at the Zaporizhzhia NPP site.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 14.95 m.

According to the IAEA, the shelling damaged the electrical transformer at the substation in Enerhodar, causing a multi-hour blackout and damage of the water pumping station and another electrical substation.

The Belarusian authorities have announced an escalation of the situation on the border with Ukraine, adding that they are ready to use tactical nuclear weapons.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 15.06 m.

One of the radiation monitoring stations near the Zaporizhzhia NPP has been damaged. This does not have any negative consequences, but it weakens the safety situation around the facility. Four of 14 radiation monitoring stations located in the 30-kilometer zone around the nuclear power plant have been completely destroyed, and some of them have not been operated at different periods of time due to damage.

A drone attacked and damaged the Luch electrical substation in occupied Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia oblast. The city was partially de-energized. This is the second damage to this substation since 2022.

The water level in the cooling pond at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is currently 15.16 m.

One of the mines placed near the ZNPP cooling pond exploded. There were no physical injuries or victims resulting from the explosion.

russia has started the second stage of exercises to practice the preparation and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which provides joint training for units of the russian and Belarusian armed forces for the combat use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The water level in the cooling pond at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is 15.26 meters.

At 13:31, the external PL-750 kV Dniprovska overhead line, which connects the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP to the Unified Energy System of Ukraine, is disconnected. Currently, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant is connected to the Ukrainian power grid only by the Zaporizhzhia TPP-Ferrosplavna PL-330 kV power transmission line.

At 16:50, Ukrainian power engineers managed to restore the operation of the damaged external PL-750 kV Dniprovska overhead line.

The IAEA reports a drone attack on a transport shop in a neighboring industrial area, damaging a civilian communication network antenna in the shop where buses used to transport plant personnel to the neighboring city of Enerhodar are stored.

Over the past week, the IAEA team of experts at ZNPP has heard signs of military activity almost daily, including artillery and rocket fire at a certain distance from the plant, as well as small arms fire both nearby and at a distance from the site.

russia is again resorting to nuclear blackmail, stating that it will conduct military exercises that will include practicing the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. The exercises will include a set of measures to practically master the preparation and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. russia’s decision to conduct tactical nuclear exercises, as well as moscow’s threats to strike at British military facilities, are part of its attempts to disrupt assistance to Ukraine through hybrid tactics of “reflexive control,” i.e., attempts to deter the West from supporting Ukraine.

The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has obtained evidence of the occupiers’ use of kamikaze drones over the nuclear reactors of the russian-occupied ZNPP. The video from the enemy fpv drone, obtained with the help of electronic intelligence means, contains UT4D.TT marking, which indicates that the drone was supplied to the occupation forces by the russian ministry of defense. The flight route of the russian kamikaze drone runs over the ZNPP power units towards the Ukrainian-controlled Nikopol and Marhanets communities, which are under constant enemy attack.

Currently, the water level in the cooling pond at Zaporizhzhya NPP is 15.43 meters.

The IAEA has reported another attempted drone attack on the training center of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. This is the third time the training center has been attacked recently, following two similar incidents last week. The IAEA experts were denied access to the training center, located outside the perimeter of the ZNPP site, to assess the incident, referring to potential safety risks.

IAEA experts at the plant reported hearing bursts of rifle fire at 11:05 a.m. local time, followed by a loud explosion at the same time as an approaching drone detonated on the roof of the plant’s training center.

According to the IAEA, a drone was shot down above the turbine hall building of Zaporizhzhia NPP Unit 1, but did not cause an explosion.

The IAEA reported that ZNPP was attacked by drones, noting that there were three damaged locations on the site, including one of the six reactor buildings, which supposedly housed surveillance and communication equipment. The IAEA experts reported seeing the remains of drones in three locations and hearing explosions and gunfire, including from artillery, near the plant throughout the day. One strike left damage on the roof of the containment building, which houses one of the six nuclear reactors. Another strike took place next to the laboratory building. The location of the third drone strike was not specified. IAEA experts reported that they observed minor surface burns on the top of the reactor dome roof at Unit 6 and scratches on the concrete slab supporting the primary feedwater storage tanks.

At 18:09, Ukrainian specialists restored the operation of the 330 kV Zaporizhzhia TPP-Ferrosplavna power transmission line, which was under repair after the russian occupiers’ shelling.

According to the IAEA, a drone strike was recorded near the oxygen and nitrogen production shop at ZNPP.

Today, at 08:30 am, the NSI Neutron Source lost off-site power supply during the shelling of Kharkiv by russian troops. The emergency power supply system operated in the regular mode, emergency diesel generators were launched. The radiation situation at the site is within standard limits.

At 10:06 a.m., as a result of shelling by the russian occupation forces, the PL-330kV Ferrosplavna-1 power transmission line, which connects Zaporizhzhia NPP to the Ukrainian energy system, was disconnected. ZNPP is powered by only one 750kV Dniprovska power transmission line, which has only recently been restored.

russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that russia has handed over to Belarus an Iskander-M missile system that can carry conventional and nuclear warheads.

Off-site power supply to the NSI Neutron Source is restored.

The NSI Neutron Source lost off-site power supply during the shelling of Kharkiv by russian troops. The emergency power supply system operated in the normal mode, emergency diesel generators were put into operation. The radiation situation at the site is within standard limits.

During a large-scale missile attack on Ukraine at 5:10 am, the external overhead line PL-750kV Dniprovska connecting the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP to the integrated energy system of Ukraine was disconnected, but Ukrainian power engineers restored the PL-750kV Dniprovska power line in a few hours.

IAEA experts at the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP reported that it also temporarily lost connection with one 750 kV power transmission line and one 330 kV line. It remained connected to the other power transmission lines and continued to operate, although at reduced capacity, until the 750 kV line was reconnected.

Currently, the water level in the cooling pond at Zaporizhzhia NPP is 15.52 meters.

Zaporizhzhia NPP has restored access to its only backup power line PL-330kV Ferosplavna-1.

The IAEA experts at ZNPP were informed of a drone attack in an area outside the ZNPP site perimeter. The incident occurred at around 18:00 on Tuesday, March 12, but the IAEA experts received the first notification from ZNPP on March 13 at 13:00, after which they immediately went to the incident site, approximately 550 meters from the site perimeter. The team observed a shallow pit in the ground with a diameter of about 70 cm, located just behind the concrete wall surrounding the off-site diesel fuel storage area, approximately 100 meters from the diesel storage tanks. The team also observed partially burnt foil/plastic in this area. The off-site diesel tanks store additional fuel for emergency diesel generators for the six ZNPP Units. The impact did not damage any structures, including a warehouse located approximately 40 meters from the impact point, and had no impact on nuclear safety.

The IAEA Board of Governors approved a Resolution on the immediate return of Zaporizhzhia NPP under the full control of Ukraine, which calls for the urgent withdrawal of unauthorized personnel, including military personnel, from ZNPP by russia and immediate return of the plant under full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities in accordance with the effective license issued by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine.

According to the IAEA, Zaporizhzhia NPP has been without backup power supply for the past ten days, leaving the facility completely dependent on a single 750 kV power line that provides the off-site power required for cooling six reactors and for ensuring other important nuclear safety functions.

As a result of russian shelling, one of the two power transmission lines available, PL-330kV Ferosplavna-1, was disconnected. The only off-site overhead line, PL-750kV Dniprovska, which connects the ZNPP to the integrated energy system of Ukraine and provides power for the plant’s own needs, remained in operation.

At the ZNPP site, the IAEA experts continued to conduct walkdowns, including of the reactor hall, safety systems premises, turbine hall and Unit 2 emergency diesel generators. The team observed an oil spill near the SFP cooling pump and water leakage at another pump of the same safety system.

Currently, the water level in the cooling pond at Zaporizhzhia NPP is 15.60 meters.

A new threat to nuclear and radiation safety may arise at Zaporizhzhia NPP, as the six-year period authorized by the manufacturer for nuclear fuel to be placed in all six reactors of the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP will expire soon. Further operation of such fuel violates the terms provisions of the technical specifications established with due regard to safety standards and may lead to the integrity loss of fuel elements and, as a consequence, to a radiation accident.

In his statement, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said that the russians have mined the perimeter of the temporarily occupied ZNPP again. The mines along the ZNPP perimeter, in the buffer zone between the inner and outer fences of the facility, which were previously identified by IAEA inspectors at the plant and removed in November 2023, have now been re-installed. This is a restricted area, inaccessible to plant personnel.

The new belarusian military doctrine will include the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This was reported by the Associated Press. “We clearly communicate Belarus’ views on the use of tactical nuclear weapons deployed on our territory. A new Chapter has appeared, where we clearly define our allied commitments to our allies,” Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin said at a Security Council Meeting.

Currently, the water level in the cooling pond at Zaporizhzhia NPP is 15.62 meters.

The self-proclaimed president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, said that all russian nuclear weapons that were planned to be delivered to Belarus are already in the country. This is stated in the press service message.

In the evening, there was a break in the Zaporizhzhia TPP — Ferosplavna 330 kV power transmission line, through which the plant received power from the Ukrainian power system. At 02:31, the last 750 kV line “Zaporizhzhia NPP — Dniprovska” was de-powered during an air alert. In connection with the blackout, the ZNPP switched to powering its loads from diesel generators. All 20 diesel generators turned on automatically, 8 of which remained in operation. Thanks to the efforts of Ukrainian specialists, at 07 on December 2, the connection with the Ukrainian power system was renewed, namely, operation of the 750 kV power transmission line was restored.

At 10:30, as a result of a short circuit approximately 100 km north of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant captured by russians, the last (fourth) line connecting with the energy system of Ukraine – PL-750 kV of the Dniprovska nuclear power plant – was disconnected. As reported by the IAEA, at that time the ZNPP was receiving off-site power from the only available backup 330 kV power transmission line. In addition, there was a partial blackout of unit 4 with the automatic switching on of the diesel generator, which was turned off manually 10 minutes later. This indicates on a problem with the power supply of the nuclear installation. The damaged 750 kV line was repaired by Ukrainian specialists at 20:52.

According to the IAEA, experts who are at the Zaporizhzhia NPP heard sounds reminding launching unguided rockets from multiple rocket launchers. Although the IAEA team did not notice the rockets due to the clouds, the typical sound indicated that they were fired from multiple rocket launchers located near the ZNPP.

After the incident at ZNPP Unit 5, associated with the primary to secondary leak, the invaders’ management of the temporarily occupied NPP decided to transfer the power unit from a “hot” to a “cold” shutdown mode. The occupiers keep ZNPP Unit 4 in a hot shutdown” state for heating and providing steam for the plant’s loads.

As a result of the transfer of power ZNPP unit 4 to the “hot” state, an incident associated with the primary to secondary leak occurred. Despite the revealed violations, the occupying management does not transfer the unit into a “cold shutdown” state, using the steam generated by power unit 5 for heating and powering the plant’s loads. Due to the incompetence of the russian staff, in particular the of the chemical shop shift Head who lost control over the saturation of the filters of the special water treatment, the primary circuit water with boric acid solution enters the turbine hall deaerator, and from there again to all steam generators. Such actions of the occupiers can lead to the loss of integrity of the steam generator tubes, which definitely does not comply with the safe operation procedures of the NPP Unit.

A blackout at ZNPP Unit 6 occurred as a result of which diesel generators and safety systems were actuated, which remained in operation for 90 minutes.

As of 08:00, a slight decrease in the water level in the cooling pond was registered: 15.68 m.

russia withdrew from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. vladimir putin signed the law on withdrawal of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The kremlin said that the withdrawal of ratification of the treaty “equalizes the situation in the field of nuclear tests for the russian federation and the United States.” The day before, the state duma of the russian federation adopted the law, and the federation council committee on international affairs and the committee on defense and security supported it and recommended it for approval.

In russia, there were unsuccessful tests of the intercontinental ballistic missile RS-24 “Yars”, which is the main ground component of the strategic nuclear forces of the russian federation. Launching of the Yars missile from the Plesetsk cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk region) at the target at the Kura training ground (Kamchatka) was performed by combat unit of Strategic Missile Forces of the 33^rd Army of the russian federation. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Yars missile went off course, as it did during the previous command and staff exercises of the strategic nuclear forces of the aggressor state on October 25, 2023.

At night, the enemy attacked the territory near the Khmelnytskyi NPP. IAEA experts, who were at the NPP site, report that the air alert started at 01:26, and two loud explosions were heard later in the morning. Subsequently, they were informed about hitting two drones at 20 and 5 kilometers distance from the NPP. As a result of the explosion, the windows of several buildings were damaged, in particular in the corridors of the reactor buildings, the auxiliary building, the special equipment building, the training center, as well as other facilities, the NPP reported. Seismic monitoring stations installed on the outskirts of the Khmelnytsky NPP also recorded the seismic effects of the explosions. Due to damage to power transmission lines, 1,860 consumers in the cities of Slavuta and Netishyn of Khmelnytskyi region were cut off. Power outage in the neighboring region of Slavuta caused the temporary transition of two out of 11 off-site radiation monitoring stations to backup power sources. Off-site power supply was restored in the afternoon.

russia carried out the exercise of launching a “massive nuclear strike”. During the military exercises, practical launches of ballistic and cruise missiles took place, the russian Ministry of Defense reports. The Yars intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk region at the Kura test site in Kamchatka, while the Syneva ballistic missile was launched from the Barents Sea from the Tula nuclear submarine. Also, the test launch of the RSM-56 “Bulava” ballistic missile from the underwater missile cruiser “Borey” was unsuccessful, which once again proved its unreliability.

According to the IAEA, following the detection of minor water leaks in two steam generators at power unit 6 at the beginning of this month, the ZNPP successfully repaired defective steam generator pipes. The tests demonstrated that no water leaks were detected in four power unit 6 steam generators. So far, ZNPP has started scheduled maintenance of the power unit’s safety systems.

the speaker of the lower house of the state duma of the russian federation stated that russia is withdrawing the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty due to the “irresponsible attitude of the USA to global security”. Although russia is withdrawing its ratification, it will remain a signatory and continue to cooperate with the Test Ban Treaty Organization and the global monitoring system that notifies the world of any tests.

As of 08:00, a slight decrease in the water level in the cooling pond was registered: 15.72 m.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is launching its planned annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise with the participation of up to six dozen aircrafts from 13 member states. The Alliance emphasizes that the Steadfast Noon exercise is “a scheduled training event that has been held annually for over ten years.” This year, maneuvers over Italy, Croatia and the Mediterranean Sea will involve various types of aircrafts, including modern fighter jets and American B-52 bombers, which will fly from the United States. The Steadfast Noon exercise involves fighter jets capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but does not use war bombs. NATO emphasizes that the maneuvers are taking place “at least 1,000 kilometers from russia’s borders” and “are unrelated to current world events.” The exercise is expected to last until October 26.

According to the IAEA, maintenance activities continue at the Zaporizhzhia NPP Unit 6 after its transition into cold shutdown state at the beginning of this month. The IAEA experts were informed that two of the unit’s steam generators had been tested at the site due to the presence of boron in the secondary circuit, which is an indication of a leak, although much smaller than that detected in one of the Unit 4 steam generators, which was subsequently repaired. Tests conducted by ZNPP at Unit 6, revealed small water leaks in one pipe of each steam generator, which were repaired and are being tested to confirm a successful repair.

As of 11:00 a.m., a slight decrease in the water level in the cooling pond was registered: 15.78 m.

russian invaders transferred Zaporizhzhia NPP Unit 4 from a “cold shutdown” to “hot shutdown” state. Instead, according to the IAEA, ZNPP Unit 6, is being transferred from a “hot” state into a “cold” state.

russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan proposed to “carry out a nuclear explosion somewhere over Siberia” in response to the strengthening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by Western partners. She stated this in a video posted on social networks. According to the propagandist, such a nuclear strike will disable all radio electronics and all satellites.

As of 06:00, a slight decrease in the water level in the cooling pond was registered: 15.83 m.

Zaporizhzhia NPP personnel started Unit 4 transfer from the cold shutdown to the hot shutdown state. Once this will be performed, ZNPP plans to transfer Unit 6 to the cold shutdown state. Unit 6 has been steaming under hot shutdown since mid-August after detection of the water leak in one of four Unit 4 steam generators.

Ukraine was elected to the IAEA Board of Governors.

The IAEA General Conference has approved a resolution demanding immediate return of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to full control of Ukraine. The resolution calls on the immediate withdrawal of all military and other unauthorized personnel from ZNPP and return the station to full control of the competent authorities of Ukraine in accordance with the existing license issued by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine to ensure its safe and secure operation, as well as to enable the IAEA to carry out efficient and effective implementation of security guarantees in compliance with the Agreement of Ukraine on Comprehensive Guarantees and the Additional Protocol. Also, the General Conference fully supported the continuation of the provision, upon request, of the technical support and assistance to Ukraine by the Agency to contribute to ensuring safe and secure operation of nuclear installations and activities related to radioactive sources, including further physical presence of the IAEA technical experts at Chornobyl, Rivne, Khmelnytsky and Pivdennoukrainsk nuclear power plants.

As of 8:00 a.m., the insignificant decrease of the cooling pond water level (15.89 m) is detected.

At Zaporizhzhia NPP, the drilling of ten wells for the underground water, which should cool the shutdown reactors of the plant after destruction of the Kakhovka HPP, was completed.

The IAEA mission at Zaporizhzhia NPP confirms the presence of the mines in the buffer zone between the inside and outside perimeter barriers of the plant.

As of 10:00 a.m., the insignificant decrease of the cooling pond water level (15.97 m) is detected.

A leak of the recirculation valve of the service water system was detected at ZNPP Unit 5. To repair this valve, one Unit 5 safety system train and one Unit 6 safety system train were disconnected. Once the valve was repaired, Unit 6 safety system train was returned to the standby mode, and Unit 5 safety system train was left in the standby mode for maintenance.

As of 9:00 a.m., the insignificant decrease of the cooling pond water level (16.05 m) is detected.

The rotation of the permanent IAEA mission, which monitors the safety at the nuclear facility under armed aggression of russia against Ukraine, was conducted at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The military servants of the russian federation mined the NPP territory which is temporarily not controlled by Ukrainian armed forces and used for the rotation of the representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency currently working at ZNPP. The sappers from Ukrainian units operating in Zaporizhzhia direction defused five russian anti-personnel mines on the mission’s route which guaranteed the safety of the experts.

As of 8:00 a.m., the insignificant decrease of the cooling pond water level (16.09 m) is detected.

The IAEA experts at Zaporizhzhia NPP continue to report on the regular signs of military activity. For example, on 14 August, they observed vibration of the room windows caused by strong explosion, and two days later they heard the shots. Another explosion near the site occurred on 17 August, five detonations were heard at some distance from ZNPP on 20 August, and five more on 21 August.

As of 09:00 AM, an insignificant water level decrease in ZNPP cooling pond was recorded (16.15 m).

As of 09:00 AM, an insignificant water level decrease in ZNPP cooling pond was recorded (16.18 m).

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi arrived at Zaporizhzhya NPP. This is his second visit since the occupation by russian forces. Grossi plans to assess the situation at the plant, communicate with operating personnel, and oversee the rotation of IAEA mission members working on-site since September 2022.

Masked occupiers broke into one of the premises at Zaporizhzhya NPP and kidnapped four employees of the physical protection service, including deputy head Mark Volkov. Their whereabouts remain unknown. According to Energoatom, the detainees had collaborated with the occupation management.

The invaders are installing additional fencing around Zaporizhzhya NPP, expanding the closed perimeter and forcing workers to cover part of their way on foot. According to the IAEA, an anti-personnel mine exploded behind the fence near the plant.

In temporarily occupied Enerhodar, russian forces continue mining the coastline and surrounding areas near Zaporizhzhya NPP, Enerhodar mayor Dmytro Orlov reported.

An explosion occurred near the turbine hall of ZNPP Unit 4. According to Ukrainian nuclear workers, the blast came from a russian mine. The occupiers tried to conceal the traces to prevent IAEA experts from seeing them.

IAEA experts confirmed that Unit 6 was transferred into cold shutdown. Tests showed no damage to the fuel cladding. Unit 5 remains in hot shutdown to provide in-house steam and power.

russian forces stored military equipment and explosives inside the turbine hall of Unit 4, according to reports discussed during the IAEA–SNRIU coordination meeting on the IAEA mission’s activities at Zaporizhzhya NPP.

The IAEA conducted an unscheduled inspection at the Institute for Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Inspectors confirmed the absence of undeclared nuclear materials; no remarks were made.

Due to russian shelling, the last Dniprovsk 750 kV power line feeding Zaporizhzhya NPP was disconnected, causing the eighth blackout since occupation. All diesel generators automatically activated, providing power for at least ten days. The line was restored after five hours.

According to Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence, russian troops continue using ZNPP Units 1, 2 and 4 as military bases, with 5–20 vehicles near each unit. Personnel are not allowed into controlled areas, and several employees who attempted inspections were beaten and hospitalized.

russia and belarus signed documents on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in belarus. moscow retains exclusive control over their potential use.

At a UN Security Council meeting, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi presented five principles to ensure Zaporizhzhya NPP safety: no attacks on or from the plant; no military use; secure off-site power; protection of all safety-critical systems; and no actions undermining these principles.

The invaders continue to militarize Enerhodar, using nearby industrial plants to repair and store military equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

russian forces blew up the Kakhovska HPP dam, threatening the ZNPP cooling system. As of 8:00 a.m., the cooling pond water level was 16.6 m—still sufficient for the plant’s needs.

Due to increasing safety risks after the destruction of Kakhovska HPP, Energoatom transferred ZNPP Unit 5 to cold shutdown. Units 1–4 and 6 remain in the same state.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi arrived in Ukraine to discuss post-Kakhovska HPP assistance and rotation of IAEA staff at ZNPP.

Grossi visited the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhya NPP to assess safety conditions.

Despite falling levels in the Kakhovka Reservoir, ZNPP’s cooling pond remained stable at 16.67 m, sufficient to support in-house systems.

After russian forces illegally transferred Unit 4 into hot shutdown, a primary-to-secondary leak occurred in steam generator 3. The unit is now being cooled down, while Unit 6 is planned for illegal transfer to hot shutdown.

russia and Belarus agreed to place tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. vladimir putin said russia had already helped convert ten Belarusian aircraft to use such weapons and transferred Iskander missile systems capable of carrying nuclear charges.

UK Minister of State for Defence Annabel Goldie said the UK would transfer Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine together with ammunition containing depleted uranium.

This triggered a new wave of russian nuclear blackmail and disinformation about “dirty bombs”: putin threatened a response if Ukraine used such munitions, and dmitry medvedev claimed that “the threat of nuclear conflict has increased.”

After seizing ZNPP in March 2022, russian forces illegally obtained US export-controlled information, according to a letter from the US DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration. They gained access to Westinghouse’s Advanced Node Code (ANC-H) and the 3KEYRELAP5-RT thermal-hydraulic modelling code used for simulators.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the occupiers began moving simulator equipment from the ZNPP training center, which was used to maintain staff qualifications.

At 03:53, the last communication line between the occupied ZNPP and Ukraine’s power system was lost due to russian missile strikes. The plant went into its sixth blackout since occupation; Units 5 and 6 were transferred to cold state and 18 diesel generators started to power in-house loads.

At 16:53 Energoatom reported the line had been repaired and the plant was being reconnected to Ukraine’s grid.

At the IAEA Board of Governors, Director General Rafael Grossi reported an increase in military formations at ZNPP and intensified hostilities around the site, warning: “Are we waiting for a nuclear emergency before we react?”

On 2–3 March, IAEA inspectors were rotated at Rivne, Pivdennoukrainsk and Khmelnytskyi NPPs to monitor safety during wartime and assess the impact of russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

In a statement after the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, the EU expressed “deep concern” over explosions near ZNPP and said the situation can be resolved only through the complete withdrawal of russian troops and equipment from the plant.

The rotation of IAEA experts at ZNPP also took place after earlier obstruction by the occupiers.

russian president vladimir putin signed a law suspending russia’s participation in the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (New START); the law took effect immediately.

IAEA experts at ZNPP reported hearing about 20 detonations during the day, apparently close to the front line near the plant.

IAEA experts reported that the 330 kV backup power line was disconnected due to military activity on the opposite bank of the Dnipro; it was briefly restored but lost again. Power was restored on Sunday afternoon.

Austria’s representative Peter Launsky-Tieffenthal told the UN General Assembly that russia’s nuclear threats pose “a direct threat to the entire international community,” noting nuclear risks are now the highest in decades.

Energoatom reported that russian security forces and Rosatom staff continue turning ZNPP into a military base: a machine-gun position was set up on the roof of Unit 5, checkpoints were placed at access routes, over 600 mobilized troops and cadets were accommodated in the plant’s shelters, and fortifications are being built around units and the dry spent fuel storage facility.

IAEA also reported that the russian military was blocking the rotation of IAEA personnel at the plant.

Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence reported that russia was preparing components of its strategic nuclear forces for launches of sea- and land-based ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles, and tested its “Monolith” centralized combat control system.

Two russian cruise missiles flew dangerously close to the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP at 08:25 and 08:27 during a massive missile attack, creating a high risk of impact on the reactor.

The Norwegian Intelligence Service reported that ships of russia’s Northern Fleet had begun to go to sea with tactical nuclear weapons for the first time in 30 years.

A massive russian missile attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure caused instability in the grid and shutdown of one Khmelnytskyi NPP unit; all safety systems worked normally. Generation at Rivne and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs also decreased.

SNRIU limited the licenses for ZNPP Units 3–6 due to non-compliance with safety requirements: military presence on site, damage to power lines, shelling, and degradation of equipment. Renewal will be possible only after de-occupation and inspection.

Enerhodar mayor Dmytro Orlov reported more frequent abductions of ZNPP workers who refused to sign contracts with the fake Rosatom-controlled company.

Russian nuclear workers from Kalinin NPP arrived at ZNPP to replace Ukrainian staff.

The IAEA permanent mission at ZNPP recorded a decrease in the water level in the Kakhovka reservoir.

putin again threatened the use of nuclear weapons during a speech in Volgograd, saying russia “has something to respond with” to the West and implying escalation if Western tanks are supplied to Ukraine.

Due to the occupation, the ZNPP full-scale simulator cannot operate: instructors refused to collaborate and were denied access. This prevents staff from maintaining mandatory skills, threatening safe operation of Europe’s largest NPP.

IAEA experts at ZNPP reported several strong explosions outside the plant that caused windows to rattle.

Energoatom reported that the occupiers lacked qualified personnel at ZNPP and were trying to recruit highly specialized nuclear experts through public ads, disregarding qualification and safety requirements.

An IAEA permanent monitoring mission began work at the Chornobyl NPP.

An IAEA permanent monitoring mission began work at the Rivne NPP.

An IAEA permanent monitoring mission began work at the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP to reduce the risks of a nuclear accident and monitor safety under wartime conditions.

ZNPP’s only 330 kV standby line, which had been repeatedly lost, was disconnected for several hours for maintenance but restored later. The plant continued to receive power from the last 750 kV line.

Air attacks caused a fire at the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kyiv. The fire damaged only a warehouse; the reactor and fuel were not affected. Radiation levels remained normal.

Russian occupiers continued to pressure ZNPP workers to take russian passports and sign contracts with the fake operator; about 1,500 employees who refused were deprived of passes. The occupiers are preparing housing for workers brought from russia.

In Enerhodar, russian occupation forces forced about 3,000 ZNPP workers to obtain so-called russian passports.

Backup power to ZNPP was restored after the damaged 330 kV line was repaired. The IAEA mission reported signs of fatigue and stress among the plant’s operating staff due to long shifts and wartime conditions.

In occupied Crimea, russian radiation, chemical and biological protection troops were deployed at the Krymskyi Tytan plant in Armiansk, raising concerns over militarization of hazardous industrial sites.

russia continued to bring its own personnel to the captured ZNPP to replace those refusing to collaborate. In January it planned to appoint Dmitrii Meniaev, a Rosatom official, as ZNPP Deputy Director for Physical Protection and Regime.

rosatom began deploying its own closed local monitoring and video surveillance system on the territory of the captured ZNPP.

IAEA experts reported that at 21:35 ZNPP was disconnected from the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 backup line due to russian shelling on the opposite bank of the Dnipro. This was the plant’s last operating backup line; repairs started immediately.

At 00:46 a Shahed kamikaze drone flew over the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP at close range, which is an unacceptable violation of nuclear and radiation safety.

russian occupiers continued to pressure ZNPP workers to sign contracts with the fake operating organization, spreading disinformation that Energoatom would stop paying salaries from 1 January 2023.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and Ukrainian PM Denys Shmyhal agreed the IAEA would ensure permanent presence of nuclear safety experts at all Ukrainian NPPs.

One Energoatom VVER-1000 unit was disconnected to repair a backup protection current transformer; it was reconnected on 11 December at 02:43. Repair of another unit damaged by the 23 November shelling was nearing completion.

IAEA experts finished their missions at Pivdennoukrainsk, Rivne and Khmelnytskyi NPPs, assessing nuclear safety, physical protection, emergency preparedness and logistics under wartime conditions.

At ZNPP, russian occupiers continued to use physical violence to force workers to sign contracts. Head of the Social Programs Department Oleksii Trubenkov, his deputy Yurii Androsov, and shift supervisor Kostiantyn Beiner were beaten and taken away to an unknown location.

Energoatom reported that russian troops brought several Grad MLRS to the ZNPP site and placed them near Unit 6 and close to the dry spent fuel storage facility, in violation of all nuclear and radiation safety norms.

ZNPP in-house power was provided again from Ukraine’s grid; all diesel generators were switched to standby. IAEA also completed a mission to Chornobyl NPP and radwaste facilities to assess needs for assistance.

Due to a frequency drop in Ukraine’s power system, RNPP, SUNPP and KhNPP units were automatically disconnected. ZNPP, already shut down, went into full blackout with all diesel generators running. It was the first time in 40 years that all Ukrainian NPP units were simultaneously disconnected from the grid.

russian troops shelled the ZNPP site, recording at least 12 hits. Overpasses, water storage tanks, blowdown system, auxiliary systems of a plant diesel generator and other infrastructure were damaged. Three hits were reported near the Raiduha substation.

The IAEA Board of Governors adopted its third resolution calling on russia to cease all actions at Ukrainian nuclear facilities, condemning pressure on ZNPP personnel and repeated loss of external power due to shelling.

SSTC NRS experts conducted a radiological survey in the Bucha district (Kyiv region) where russian troops had been stationed. No radioactive contamination or increased gamma dose rates were found; values were up to 0.12 μSv/h, within background.

Due to russian missile attacks, Khmelnytskyi NPP lost access to the grid and was temporarily powered by diesel generators; two reactors were shut down. Power was later restored through 330 kV lines but with subsequent brief losses. One Rivne NPP unit was automatically disconnected due to loss of a 750 kV line, but power to the grid was later restored.

From 8 to 11 November 2022, SSTC NRS experts with the RanidSONNI mobile radiological lab surveyed the Makarov territorial community to detect radioactive contamination that could have been taken out of the Exclusion Zone. No contamination or increase of gamma dose rate was found; EDR values were up to 0.18 μSv/h, which corresponds to local background.

At about 22:00, 750 kV power supply to all six ZNPP units was restored. Eight operating emergency diesel generators were disconnected and switched to standby.

IAEA inspectors completed checks at three locations in Ukraine, carried out at Kyiv’s request, and found no evidence of illicit nuclear activities or materials, refuting russian claims about a so-called “dirty bomb.”

Russian shelling damaged the last two high-voltage lines connecting ZNPP to Ukraine’s power system. At 23:04 the plant went into complete blackout; all 20 diesel generators started, 9 remained in operation. Units 5 and 6 were put into cold state. Fuel for DGs is sufficient for 15 days.

Ukrainian ZNPP staff resumed heat supply to Enerhodar by transferring two units to hot shutdown. Water temperature reached 51°C, enough to protect utility networks, though still insufficient for full heating. Since May, ZNPP has been supplying heat and water instead of the shut-down ZTPP.

Russian occupiers placed electronic warfare systems on the roof of ZNPP Unit 5, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine reported.

In the evening, a mine exploded beyond the perimeter fence of ZNPP, which led to the disconnection of a 750 kV external line and loss of the ZNPP-4 power supply line, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said.

Within three days SSTC NRS crews with the RanidSONNI mobile lab surveyed the Ivankiv and Polissia territorial communities to detect radioactive materials that could have been taken out of the Exclusion Zone. No contamination was found; EDR values were up to 0.19 μSv/h, i.e. natural background.

For a week, russian occupiers conducted unauthorized construction at the ZNPP dry spent fuel storage facility (173 containers stored). Ukrainian staff and IAEA were not allowed to the site. Such works are an illicit interference in the plant design and a gross violation of the license and international nuclear safety requirements, as damage to containers could cause a radiation accident over hundreds of km².

G7 called on russia to return full control of ZNPP to Ukraine, withdraw all russian personnel and stop attempts to bring the plant under russian control that aggravate safety risks.

At the UNGA First Committee, russian representative Kostyantyn Vorontsov said russia opposed a demilitarized zone around ZNPP, claiming it would allow a Ukrainian counterattack.

Russian shelling of Ukrainian substations caused disconnection of the last 750 kV ZNPP–Dniprovska line at 03:59. Due to the voltage drop, the ZNPP in-house transformer tripped and DGs started. The 750 kV Pivdennoukrainsk NPP–Dniprovska line was also disconnected, without affecting PNPP loads.

Russians kidnapped ZNPP IT Service Head Oleh Kostyukov and Director General’s assistant Oleh Osheka and took them to an unknown location.

PACE adopted a resolution declaring russia a terrorist regime, noting its nuclear threats and militarization of ZNPP as abhorrent and incompatible with the role of a nuclear power and UNSC permanent member.

Ukrainian specialists restored the 750 kV ZNPP–Dniprovska line.

Energoatom sent another diesel fuel convoy to ZNPP, but russian forces did not let the trucks pass.

At 08:59 russian shelling damaged the Dniprovska substation, which caused emergency disconnection of the 750 kV ZNPP–Dniprovska line and total blackout at the plant; DGs started automatically.

Russian forces kidnapped Valerii Martyniuk, ZNPP Deputy Director General, and are holding him in an unknown location, probably using torture and intimidation.

Ukrainian specialists repaired and re-energized the 750 kV ZNPP–Dniprovska line damaged on 8 October. Radiation levels on and around the site remained normal.

At 00:59, russian shelling damaged and disconnected the last 750 kV ZNPP–Dniprovska line, causing loss of off-site power and automatic start of diesel generators. Fuel reserves allow DG operation for about 10 days.

Rosatom registered in Moscow a JSC “Operating Organization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP” to manage the occupied plant.

Energoatom President Petro Kotin assumed duties of ZNPP Director General.

ZNPP Director General Ihor Murashov, abducted on 30 September, was released and arrived at the off-site ZNPP Emergency Center in Zaporizhzhia.

In russia, a freight train with special-purpose military equipment of the 12th Main Directorate of the russian MoD (responsible for nuclear engineering support and safety) was observed in transit.

Around 16:00, russian patrol detained ZNPP Director General Ihor Murashov on his way from the plant to Enerhodar, blindfolded him and took to an unknown destination. His whereabouts were unknown until 3 October.

At 01:13, russian shelling damaged equipment connecting ZNPP Unit 6 to the switchyard. The unit’s block transformer and in-house transformers disconnected, which led to automatic start of two diesel generators for safety systems. At 02:00 staff restored power supply from other units and the DGs were put on standby.

At 00:20, russian missiles struck the industrial area of Pivdennoukrainsk NPP, with an explosion 300 m from the reactors. Buildings sustained blast damage; a 4 m wide crater was found. One hydropower unit of the Oleksandriv HPP tripped, and three high-voltage lines briefly disconnected and reconnected.

The IAEA Board of Governors (26 votes in favor, 2 against, 7 abstentions) adopted a resolution demanding russia cease all actions against ZNPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine and withdraw its forces.

At 03:41, ZNPP Unit 6 was disconnected from the grid. Preparations for cooldown and transfer to cold shutdown began. The unit had been operating in island mode for several days at low power to supply ZNPP’s own needs because all external power lines were damaged.

Russian shelling again hit the city of Voznesensk, 30 km from PNPP; civilian facilities were damaged and there were casualties.

Occupation official and traitor Yevhen Balytsky threatened strikes on Khmelnytskyi and Rivne NPPs with Kalibr missiles, openly using nuclear blackmail rhetoric.

IAEA published its report on the mission to ZNPP: it confirmed presence of russian military, vehicles and equipment on site (including in turbine halls), pressure on staff by Rosatom representatives, damage from shelling, loss of off-site power sources and difficult conditions for personnel. IAEA proposed creating a nuclear safety and security protection zone around ZNPP.

Four of six IAEA inspectors completed work at ZNPP and left. Over the previous days, intense russian shelling damaged multiple 750 kV and 330 kV lines (ZNPP–Dniprovska, ZNPP–Kakhovska, ZNPP–Melitopol) and a 750/330 kV autotransformer. A fire on the 330 kV ZNPP–Ferosplavna line caused its disconnection and Unit 6, which powered the plant’s needs, was unloaded and disconnected.

After russian shelling of ZNPP’s power connections, and due to insufficient capacity of the last backup line for two units, at 19:35 Unit 5 was disconnected from the grid. Unit 6 remained in operation at limited capacity and supplied both the Ukrainian grid and ZNPP’s own needs.

ZNPP Unit 5, disconnected in the morning of 1 September due to mortar shelling, was reconnected at 13:10. Two units were generating for Ukraine.

At 04:57 Enerhodar and the ZNPP site came under mortar fire; emergency protection tripped and Unit 5 was disconnected. The 330 kV in-house line was damaged, causing a brief blackout of Unit 2 with DG start. Unit 6 continued to operate and power ZNPP’s needs.

Despite russian shelling of the pre-agreed route, the IAEA mission reached ZNPP at 14:26. By 18:00 DG Rafael Mariano Grossi and most of the delegation left; 5 experts remained on site to continue work.

Russian forces continued shelling Enerhodar and the ZNPP site. Ten civilians were injured, including four NPP employees.

At 14:04, one of the ZNPP units disconnected on 25 August was reconnected to the grid; the second was reconnected at 21:15. Equipment and safety systems operated normally.

Following Ukraine’s request, the EU provided 5.5 million potassium iodide pills for the population near ZNPP (5 million from EU strategic reserves, 0.5 million from Austria).

Due to hostilities and fires near ZNPP, the 750 kV Dniprovska line was disconnected twice. Three other lines had already been damaged. Unit 5 was disconnected with emergency protection; Unit 6 powered only its own needs.

At 12:29, after the 750 kV line was restored, Unit 6 was reconnected, but at 14:14 the line was lost again and the unit tripped again. For the first time in history, ZNPP was completely disconnected from Ukraine’s grid; its needs were powered via the ZTPP 330 kV line.

Russian forces shelled the ash dumps of the Zaporizhzhia TPP to raise dust with elevated radioactivity (≈2.5× background). Dust clouds were blown toward Enerhodar; monitoring showed an increase in radiation levels near the NPP.

Russians brought additional APCs and special trucks into the ZNPP repair zone; over 40 military vehicles were on site, including 16 near Unit 1 and 12 under the overpass.

At 14:33, russian shelling of the Zaporizhzhia TPP damaged reserve own-needs transformers (RTSN-5;6) and disconnected the 330 kV ZNPP–ZTPP line. At 18:33 the line was restored.

Russian troops struck the city of Voznesensk near PNPP; missile debris was found, which Ukraine called another act of nuclear terrorism.

Russians also shelled ZNPP, damaging an overpass used by staff.

On 19–20 August, IAEA inspected Rivne NPP under safeguards to confirm absence of undeclared nuclear material.

At 00:15, russian occupiers fired in the direction of the ZNPP training center from at least two positions (bus station and discharge channel); impacts were registered with different time lags.

SNRIU amended ZNPP Units 1 and 2 operating licenses: Unit 1 is to operate only in “fuel reloading – cold shutdown,” and Unit 2 in “cold shutdown,” based on Energoatom’s application and SNRIU Board Resolution of 4 August 2022 on ZNPP safety under occupation.

From 15:00 to 15:30, russian forces shelled Enerhodar over six times; one ZNPP employee was killed.

IAEA published the EU note verbale and Joint Statement by IAEA member states calling on russia to immediately withdraw forces from ZNPP so Ukrainian staff can work without intimidation.

Five strikes were registered near the ZNPP command post, welding area and radiation source storage facility. Later the russian military shelled the fire station that protects ZNPP, preventing timely shift change; previous shift continued working.

SNRIU Licensing Commission restored Chornobyl NPP licenses for decommissioning, operation of the confinement and Shelter, and for RAW management facilities (including Vektor) after war-related disruptions.

As of 08:00, ZNPP was operating with risk of violation of radiation and fire safety. Reports indicated probable mining of the turbine hall and areas around the plant, storage of ammunition under overpasses and near units, and deployment of MLRS near Vodyane.

In the evening, russian occupiers again fired at the ZNPP site near the dry spent fuel storage facility, damaging three radiation monitoring sensors and about 800 m² of windows; one employee was wounded. Up to 500 russian troops and Rosatom staff hid in the plant’s bunkers.

At 14:30, russian shelling caused three strikes near the ZNPP industrial site, damaging the 330 kV ZNPP–ZTPP autotransformer line. Emergency protection was actuated and DGs started; the unit was unloaded and disconnected.

MLRS shelling of Enerhodar damaged the “Luch” power station, leaving most of the city without electricity and water.

In the evening, another MLRS strike hit directly on the ZNPP site, damaging the nitrogen-oxygen station and joint auxiliary building, creating risks of hydrogen leakage and increased fire hazard.

Canada allocated USD 1 million to IAEA to strengthen nuclear safety and security at Ukrainian NPPs and USD 5 million to the U.S. State Department to support Ukraine in detecting and responding to illicit nuclear trafficking.

At least 14 units of heavy military equipment with ammunition and explosives were placed by russian troops in the ZNPP-1 turbine hall near the main oil tank and hydrogen-cooled generator, blocking access for firefighting vehicles and increasing fire and explosion risks.

Russian occupiers kidnapped Serhii Pykhtin (Deputy Head of the decontamination shop) and engineer Olena Ryabtseva, seized ID passes and entered the radiation zone of ZNPP-2 in violation of stay rules, exposing personnel to contamination risks. The same day they seized the ZNPP training center and canteen at gunpoint.

Russians continued kidnapping ZNPP personnel; Head of the Environmental Protection Service Ihor Kvashnin was abducted.

SSTC NRS completed the first phase of radiation survey of de-occupied Kyiv region (Bucha, Vorzel, Hostomel, Ozera, Moschun, and Ivankiv community) using the RanidSONNI mobile lab. Routes were based on local residents’ info about possible contamination spots.

In the no-fly zone over Enerhodar, a russian Ka-52 attack helicopter dropped an unidentified cylindrical object on a building of the ZNPP training center outside the industrial site.

Australia and France provided PPE and dosimetric/radiometric devices to Ukraine through the IAEA RANET mechanism.

IAEA conducted a safeguards inspection at Rivne NPP under the NPT-related agreement to verify absence of undeclared nuclear material.

At the occupied ZNPP, the plant management was forced to allow a russian propagandist blogger with a Rosatom representative and armed military into the MCR of a power unit and other restricted premises, which is a gross violation of safety and regime requirements.

Since 27 June, SSTC NRS teams with the RanidSONNI mobile lab carried out multiple radiation surveys in Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel, Ozera and Blystavitsa: 63 apartments, 68 private estates, 120 km of roads, 20 parks and squares, and about 300 items were inspected based on residents’ reports of possible contamination.

Russian occupiers left Chornobyl NPP, forcing its workers to sign a certificate of plant acceptance. When retreating, they stole transfer casks, spare parts for NPP equipment, and looted computers, coffee makers, teapots and tableware from the nearby hotel.

At the Chornobyl NPP industrial site, Ukrainian personnel ensuring nuclear and radiation safety raised the flag of Ukraine despite ongoing occupation.

The European Technical Safety Organizations Network (ETSON) decided to suspend cooperation with the russian STC NRS at an extraordinary meeting of full ETSON members.

Units of the National Guard of Ukraine arrived at the Chornobyl NPP to protect and defend nuclear facilities and secure nuclear materials.

The Ministry of Health of Ukraine issued Order No. 585 “On Approval of Methodological Recommendations for Actions in Nuclear Damage Zones,” to guide preventive measures in case of tactical or strategic nuclear weapon use.

During the plenary meeting of WENRA, it was decided to exclude Rostekhnadzor (russia) and Gosatomnadzor (Belarus) from participation in all WENRA activities until further notice.

The Energy Community established a Fund for Ukraine to restore war-damaged energy infrastructure. The EU and its member states became fund donors, with Denmark making the first contribution.

ChNPP personnel continued assessing damage caused by russian forces, conducting radiological surveys. The occupiers violated radiation safety rules, contaminating ChNPP office and industrial premises.

The State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management reported the destruction of the automated radiation monitoring system and looting of laboratories of the Institute for Safety Problems of NPPs, where radiation sources and samples of fuel materials went missing.

The second personnel rotation since ChNPP occupation took place — 51 employees returned to Slavutych. No personnel who had been at the plant since its capture remained at ChNPP.

During russian occupation, the Centralized Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) was not damaged. Preparations began for resuming operations after martial law ends.

All russian soldiers who dug trenches in the Red Forest received lethal radiation doses. According to scientists, they disturbed contaminated soil containing radioactive isotopes of cesium, carbon, and uranium.

The OECD suspended russia’s membership in the Nuclear Energy Agency, effective 11 May 2022.

Dmitry Medvedev stated that if Sweden and Finland joined NATO, russia would deploy nuclear weapons in the Baltics.

Three russian missiles flew over South Ukraine NPP, one recorded by security cameras. The risk of hitting the reactor was high.

The Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) was declared ready for operation after power restoration and system checks.

ChNPP maintenance staff restored direct telephone connection with the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate’s duty officer.

ZNPP remained under russian occupation. Rosatom representatives informed management of plans to include the plant in their corporate structure and began monitoring technical and administrative processes.

ZNPP and Enerhodar remained under russian control, but Ukrainian personnel continued operating the units for Ukraine’s needs, with limited worker rotation allowed.

Two russian cruise missiles flew over Khmelnytskyi NPP’s cooling pool, threatening a nuclear disaster. SNRIU granted a permit for commissioning the Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility. Russian FM Sergey Lavrov acknowledged the reality of nuclear war risks.

Two russian missiles flew over ZNPP at low altitude toward Zaporizhzhia, causing explosions. IAEA DG Rafael Grossi arrived in Ukraine with an expert mission to ChNPP for radiological monitoring. SNRIU suspended several ChNPP licenses due to safety noncompliance after occupation.

IAEA inspected the South Ukraine NPP under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Inspectors also inventoried nuclear material at Chornobyl facilities and restored remote monitoring systems.

IAEA conducted an inspection at Khmelnytskyi NPP under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Rosatom sent eight nuclear engineers to ZNPP demanding confidential operational data. On Russian TV, propagandists publicly threatened nuclear strikes on the UK, Germany, and France, showing missile flight times from Kaliningrad.

The last 330 kV line was restored, completing reliable power supply to the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone.

The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine launched criminal proceedings for the seizure of the Chornobyl NPP. The EU began considering a ban on imports of russian nuclear fuel and cooperation with Rosatom.

Chornobyl NPP fully restored individual dosimetric monitoring of its personnel.

Inspection for explosives at the Chornobyl site was completed; demining teams discovered and neutralized several mines. A forest fire near Dytyatky damaged a fire truck and injured two rescuers. Russian IL-80 “doomsday” aircraft was spotted over Moscow. Occupiers seized a special ZNPP vehicle for propaganda use.

The Chornobyl NPP’s fire extinguisher charging station resumed operation after being looted and damaged during occupation.

At Chornobyl NPP, full control over ISF-1 water chemistry was restored after the end of russian occupation.

Zaporizhzhia NPP and Enerhodar continued under russian control and pressure, while Ukrainian personnel maintained operations.

In Gomel, seven medical vehicles arrived at the Republican Scientific and Practical Center for Radiation Medicine and Human Ecology. Reports indicate that exposed russian soldiers were brought there from the Chornobyl NPP.

Rosatom representatives continued to remain at the Zaporizhzhia NPP site. Plant personnel and their families faced ongoing psychological pressure, with cases of interrogations and detentions by russian occupiers.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi made a two-day visit to Ukraine, meeting at the South Ukraine NPP to discuss nuclear safety and security issues concerning Ukrainian nuclear facilities.

The neutron source facility in Kharkiv was shelled again, though no new damage was identified.

Russian troops captured Slavutych, where Chornobyl NPP staff and their families live, increasing pressure on personnel ensuring nuclear and radiation safety at the plant.

The neutron source facility sustained further damage — insulation lining and coating materials in the experimental hall were destroyed due to renewed shelling.

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark warned that Vladimir Putin could potentially order a tactical nuclear strike on Poland to deter NATO involvement in Ukraine.

At a CERN Council meeting, members voted to suspend collaboration with russian and Belarusian institutions, halting joint events and freezing the observer status of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (Dubna).

An unexploded 9K58 Smerch missile was found near the neutron source in Kharkiv, posing a risk of detonation. The facility also sustained further window and structural damage, though key safety systems remained intact.

In Chornobyl, russian troops looted and destroyed the Central Analytical Laboratory, stealing and damaging 133 radioactive sources totaling about 7 million becquerels. The current location and integrity of these materials remain unknown.

Rosatom personnel continued their illegal presence at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, while russian forces and heavy military equipment occupied the plant and nearby city of Enerhodar. The psychological pressure on workers created serious risks of human error that could endanger nuclear safety.

At the occupied Chornobyl NPP, 46 new volunteers replaced 50 staff members, marking the first partial personnel rotation since the plant’s capture.

Fighting in the Piatykhatky district of Kharkiv left the neutron source facility without power supply.

For the 23rd consecutive day, Chornobyl NPP personnel continued working without rotation under occupation, maintaining the safety of nuclear facilities despite extreme conditions.

Hostilities in Kharkiv damaged power lines to the neutron source facility, cutting off its supply.

In Zaporizhzhia, shelling disrupted high-voltage lines (Zaporizhzhia, South Donbass, and Kakhovka 750 kV), temporarily cutting the plant’s connection to the grid. Power was later restored after emergency repairs.

Power was restored to all Chornobyl NPP facilities, allowing diesel generators to be shut off. Energoatom denied reports of supply from Belarus’ Mozyr substation.

Two 750 kV high-voltage lines (Zaporizhzhia and South Donbass) remained offline, and the Kakhovka line was again disconnected at 14:29.

Two 750 kV high-voltage lines (Zaporizhzhia and South Donbass) remained disconnected.

For the 20th day, Chornobyl staff continued to work without rotation, maintaining plant safety under occupation.

Occupiers again damaged the power line supplying Chornobyl NPP and Slavutych shortly after it was repaired by Ukrenergo.

Russian troops detonated unexploded ordnance near Zaporizhzhia NPP reactor units from the 4 March shelling.

Ukrenergo repaired the high-voltage line supplying Chornobyl and Slavutych, but it was soon damaged again by russian troops. Repair teams were forced to return to the occupied area to locate new damage.

Zaporizhzhia NPP reported stable radiation monitoring and continued rotation of personnel ensuring safe reactor operation.

Eleven representatives of Rosatom arrived at the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP. Plant management continued under Ukrainian staff, though all technical decisions required occupier approval. Two 750 kV lines (Zaporizhzhia and South Donbass) remained disconnected.

The neutron source in Kharkiv was bombed again, losing power and suffering surface damage, though critical safety systems remained intact.

Shelling damaged the 750 kV Chornobyl–Kyiv line, fully de-energizing Chornobyl NPP and Exclusion Zone facilities. Spent fuel cooling was interrupted, creating risks of overheating and radioactive release.

Chornobyl NPP personnel continued working for the 13th consecutive day without rotation. Regulatory oversight in the Exclusion Zone was impossible. The OECD suspended russia and Belarus from its governing bodies.

Zaporizhzhia NPP Unit 6 was shut down for emergency repairs after detecting oil system damage caused by shelling on 4 March.

The “Neutron Source” facility in Kharkiv sustained heavy damage after bombing — power substation destruction, coolant line rupture, and shattered windows. Several radiation sensors in Chornobyl’s Shelter facility failed, disabling monitoring in some areas.

Russian troops staged fake “humanitarian aid” scenes at Chornobyl, dressing in NOVARKA uniforms to create propaganda footage. Later, shelling damaged the 750 kV line near Vasylivka, Zaporizhzhia region.

Zaporizhzhia NPP personnel continued operating under the supervision of armed russian forces, maintaining safety systems despite intimidation.

Russian forces captured the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Artillery shelling damaged reactor unit 1 and struck near the dry spent fuel storage area. A fire broke out at the plant’s training center adjacent to the main site.

The Polish Nuclear Society announced the suspension of cooperation with russian institutions until the end of the war and accountability for all responsible for violating international law.

For seven days, Chornobyl NPP personnel remained without rotation, maintaining plant operations under occupation. Control over radiation safety at ChNPP and in the Exclusion Zone was lost.

Fighting near Voznesensk, 30 km from South Ukraine NPP, involved russian helicopters and armored vehicles. Ukrainian forces repelled the attack and destroyed bridges to prevent further advance toward the NPP.

Missile strikes damaged the communication network at Zaporizhzhia NPP, disabling its automated radiation monitoring system (ARMS) and halting data transmission to the IAEA IRMIS system. Repairs were impossible due to ongoing hostilities.

At 01:20, a shell hit near the Kyiv Radon radioactive waste facility. The fence was damaged, but storage structures remained intact, and radiation levels were normal.

Putin ordered russian nuclear deterrent forces to high alert, threatening the possible use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine. All Ukrainian NPPs continued safe operation under heightened monitoring.

Russian troops faked an air battle over the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone to produce propaganda about alleged Ukrainian attacks. Ukrainian forces avoided any military action near the zone due to nuclear risks.

The automated radiation monitoring system recorded increased background radiation in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, likely from disturbed contaminated soil by russian military vehicles. Operating NPPs reported normal radiation levels.

At 20:00, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that russian troops had seized the Chornobyl NPP, taking personnel hostage.