Rumina Velshi: “The Ukrainian experience holds significant value for Canada across multiple domains, particularly considering the unfolding events during the full-scale invasion”

Rumina Velshi, former President and CEO of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), has joined ORLEN Synthos Green Energy in Poland as a Senior Advisor to the CEO and Board of Directors. Ms. Velshi will provide strategic scientific and technical advice and support concerning the deployment of GE-Hitachi BWRX-300 Small Modular Reactors in Poland and Europe, especially in the United Kingdom, where the government decided to support BWRX-300 licensing process.

Before leaving post as President of the Canadian regulator, in August 2023, Ms. Rumina Velshi paid a working visit to Ukraine and signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation and information exchange on nuclear regulatory matters by the state nuclear regulators of Ukraine and Canada.

During our conversation with Ms. Rumina Velshi, we discussed various topics, including the current challenges confronting Canadian regulator, the revival of Ukrainian-Canadian regulatory collaboration as outlined in the Memorandum, the deployment of small modular reactors, strategies for radioactive waste management, and methods for engaging the public in these matters.

– Ms. Velshi, you were the Head of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, tell us about the tasks and challenges faced by the regulator today?

Firstly, I would like to tell about the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), which is Canada’s nuclear regulator, and highlight its institutional functions. Canada is one of the leading producers of uranium in the world, has a complex nuclear fuel cycle, and 19 nuclear power units. Furthermore, the country manages nuclear research reactors and stands as the second-largest producer of medical isotopes globally.  

As a nuclear regulator, we oversee all aspects of the nuclear industry except for the defense sector and consumer goods. Our organization includes almost 1000 employees. Unlike the SNRIU, technical support (ed. note: in Ukraine it is the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety – SSTC NRS) is incorporated within the CNSC, thus combining two organizations into one. We also have a Commission consisting of 7 members that is responsible for decision-making on licensing, approving rules and standards, etc.

In terms of tasks and challenges, they are very similar for all regulators. Society creates a powerful foundation for changes, development of new technologies, and the regulator must ensure that it is prepared for regulatory activities and not regarded as an obstacle to innovation. Thus, the significant challenge, in my view, lies in adapting to the changes and uncertainties that accompany innovation and finding appropriate ways to regulate them.  

Even amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, we witnessed a decline in public trust, not only within the nuclear industry but also across various institutions and science-based decision-making. And as we know, nuclear power tends to polarized opinions. Therefore, when we consider the introduction of new technologies in communities where nuclear energy has never been used before, it becomes imperative to ensure effective education and information dissemination while addressing public concerns. Thus, the whole area of building public trust is both a challenge and an opportunity at the same time.

And the last thing is attracting and retaining the best personnel. It is a highly competitive and growing market, so we must strive to make the nuclear sector a promising place to employ the best talent and ensure that they have career growth in the nuclear industry. I believe these to be the primary challenges facing us today.

– In August 2023, you signed a Memorandum with the Ukrainian nuclear regulator, could you please tell us about the resumption of cooperation between the regulators, because the last such experience dates back to the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s.

I have held this position for 5 years, preceded by a 7-year tenure as a Commission member, but the organization did not cooperate with the Ukrainian regulator. Yes, you correctly noticed that earlier we already had the partnership experience, which I associate with the joint struggle against the Chornobyl disaster consequences, but it was not long-lasting. Since the beginning of the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian regulator has made significant efforts to establish contacts with other Western regulators, in particular with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the UK Office of Nuclear Regulation. The SNRIU holds systematic meetings with international regulators to disseminate information about Ukraine’s situation and offer essential assistance or consultations in specific domains.

This led both parties to express the desire to formalize their collaboration through a Memorandum of Understanding. Consequently, during my visit to Ukraine in August, one of the primary objectives was to sign a Memorandum, discuss cooperation areas and necessary assistance, and in late September, during the IAEA General Conference, we engaged in four meetings that resulted in the agreement on an Action Plan. This plan encompasses specific measures and defined outcomes to be achieved.

Moreover, our engagement extends beyond offering support; it’s also an opportunity for mutual learning. Ukraine’s nuclear industry and its regulatory body represent a mature system, providing us with valuable insights and knowledge exchange opportunities. I am particularly pleased that this Memorandum opens up promising prospects for our collaborative efforts.

– The Memorandum outlines 10 areas of cooperation between the Ukrainian and Canadian regulators. In your opinion, what are the most appropriate steps to start cooperation?  

During our September meeting, we delved into this exact question, and I have a proposed answer.

First, both Ukraine and Canada are considering the possibility of developing small modular reactors. However, our country has been working in this area for a long time, and we have already established a pre-licensing process, which provides for a preliminary review and assessment of the nuclear installation design. SSTC NRS specialists took the Canadian experience as a basis and developed their own pre-license assessment procedure, which was approved by the SNRIU Board on October 19. Thus, one of the areas is assistance in the implementation of the pre-licensing process of nuclear installations.

Secondly, it is the issue of managing the industrial waste resulting from legacy uranium mining that Ukraine inherited (note: after the collapse of the Soviet Union). Canada has confronted this issue for several decades and has made notable advancements in the long-term storage of radioactive waste, including the construction of deep geological repositories designed for high-level waste. Therefore, waste disposal emerged as another key domain in which we reached an agreement to collaborate jointly.

Thirdly, it is ensuring the NPP safety. I learned both from the regulator and from NNEGC “Energoatom” that the operator is strengthening the protection of nuclear installations to make them more resistant to attacks. As you know, I represent not only the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, I am also the Chair of the IAEA Safety Standards Commission. We analyzed the standards to determine whether they are acceptable under the war conditions, and here, I find the Ukrainian experience and the articulated perspectives on these standards exceptionally valuable and pertinent to the current situation.   

Also, as you know, during my visit to Ukraine, I visited the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and saw with my own eyes the consequences of the occupation, the destruction and damage caused, we discussed the suspension of licenses for activities in the field of nuclear energy use in the Exclusion Zone, and then about their renewal. Through these exchanges, we learned valuable lessons from the Ukrainian regulator regarding safety assessments and the measures taken to ensure compliance with all safety requirements.

I believe that the Ukrainian experience is useful for Canada in many areas, especially given what happened and is happening during the full-scale invasion. Therefore, it is necessary to draw up a work plan, as well as agree on a visit of SNRIU experts to Canada so that they come and talk with our specialists face-to-face for the purpose of experience exchange. The Memorandum of Understanding signifies a genuine commitment to fostering greater and more robust cooperation between regulators. It serves as a platform supporting Ukraine in strengthening its ties with the Western world.

– As we know, Canada is very active in implementing small modular reactors, could you please tell us about the SMR licensing experience in Canada? What approaches do you apply?

It’s been over four decades since Canada last licensed a new nuclear reactor. With the emergence of new Small Modular Reactor (SMR) facilities, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has spent approximately a decade strategizing on how to prepare for regulating and licensing these SMRs. Our primary objective was to ensure that our legal framework was robust enough to effectively license and regulate all the SMRs within our consideration. This commitment drove us to continuously update our legal framework, regulatory documents, and requirements, ensuring they remain current and responsive to the evolving landscape.

I’ve previously addressed a pivotal aspect of our regulatory and legal framework preparation – the implementation of a pre-licensing process. This process entails conducting an initial review and assessment of nuclear installation designs. It offers technology developers the opportunity to acquaint themselves with Canada’s regulatory procedures. From the CNSC’s perspective, this process serves as a valuable learning opportunity about various technologies even before the licensing phase commences. It allows us to streamline the process by identifying any potential shortcomings or concerns regarding the technology. During the preliminary review and evaluation of a nuclear facility’s design, we assess whether there are any regulatory concerns that the developer should address before initiating the licensing process.

Hence, our licensing process commences with pre-licensing procedures. Similarly to many other countries, we have established protocols for obtaining strategic environmental assessments and environmental impact assessments. Furthermore, one of the integral stages of our licensing framework involves securing a license for site preparation and assessment, allowing for the deployment of new reactor installations. Notably, one can initiate the licensing process by obtaining a license for the site without immediately committing to a specific technology. The subsequent phase involves acquiring a construction license. Presently, our focus lies on deliberating the construction of four GE Hitachi BWRX-300 power units, each with a capacity of 300 MW, at the Darlington site. The developer has successfully obtained environmental assessments and a site preparation license, having applied for a construction license last year. We anticipate the decision to grant the construction license by the end of next year, enabling the commencement of construction activities. Subsequently, an operating license will be sought for operations planned to commence in 2028-29, followed by the necessity of obtaining a decommissioning license. It’s noteworthy that the licensing process for small modular reactors closely aligns with the established standards we’ve used in previous licensing procedures. 

It has been a considerable period since we initiated the pre-licensing process, and I am confident that the licensing procedures will continue to evolve, particularly considering the diverse risks associated with small modular reactors. It’s like applying the entire desktop licensing process to an iPod, illustrating the substantial differences between SMRs and traditional high-power reactors. While nuclear fission, radiation, and safety remain central, the safety system requirements introduced for SMRs are fundamentally different. Therefore, as we gain experience, we will look for ways to make the licensing process more efficient, more rational and more risk-oriented. 

The development of the GE Hitachi BWRX-300 design is progressing rapidly, and we are working closely with the US NRC on licensing and assessing the SMR design. As we chose the same technology, regulators, utilities, and the developer of the GE Hitachi BWRX-300 technology strive for a standardized design. In October, Poland joined the joint review of the design, because they also chose this technology. We remain open to collaboration with other nations, extending an invitation that essentially says: “Should you select the same technology, support standardized SMR designs, and share our goal of expediting progress without hindrances, we are eager to facilitate and welcome you into the BWRX-300 group.”

– Communication projects and strategies in the field of nuclear safety research have been defined as one of the cooperation areas. Could you tell us please how you in Canada engage the public and how exactly do you consider public opinion when introducing innovative technologies?

Before starting answering I would like to repeat again that building public trust is one of the biggest challenges and opportunities at the same time.

When it comes to small modular reactors, public engagement must commence long before contemplating technology choices and site selections. In Canada, before implementing nuclear or any other new technology, public information sessions are held. Our staff hold so-called meetings with the regulator, during which they meet with the public, tell the people who the regulator is and what it does, and listen to their concerns. So we are constantly interacting with the public. In addition, we maintain a very active website where we disseminate extensive information, we regularly organize information seminars, are invited to give presentations.

We also have various forums. For example, the forum of environmental non-governmental organizations is attended by various segments of the public, as a rule, ecologists, experts in certain fields, who sometimes oppose nuclear energy. We’ve established a forum specifically for a consortium of non-governmental organizations (NGO group) and conduct regular meetings, where we communicate our ongoing efforts and future plans, while also listening to their concerns and discussing avenues for their involvement in our initiatives.

Besides, let’s not forget that Canada has many nuclear facilities, so we need to make sure that people are fully informed about both the risks and the benefits associated with their operation. Therefore, we have tons of documents and agreements concluded with the communities, and this can only happen after a dialogue is built. Additionally, we allocate funding to non-governmental organizations and communities, aiding in their capacity building and facilitating their participation in our decision-making processes, especially concerning licensing matters.

Thus, we have a detailed strategy for building trust, which is complex, comprehensive and requires us to be more transparent, communicate better, build closer relationships, solve problematic issues. We have initiated public surveys and plan to conduct them more frequently in the future to understand the problems, concerns and needs of the public.

In my opinion, this is an area where Canada has made significant progress and has a positive experience, as our approach is centered on inclusivity, transparency, proactive engagement, and providing necessary financial support.

– Is there a difference between public hearings during the implementation of small modular reactors and during the construction high-capacity reactors? Could you please provide more details on this?

There is practically no difference. Hearings during which the Commission makes decisions are open and the public can participate in them, ask questions and make their suggestions. As for the deployment of first small modular reactors, we are currently reviewing an application for a construction license, so a public hearing will take place this year. We also received an application for an environmental assessment, which also involves public hearings. At this stage, whether it’s the construction of a large or small reactor, the process remains the same.

– For many years, Canada has been a leader in uranium mining. Are there currently any facilities in your country that need to be decommissioned and what conceptual solutions are being adopted?

I am not sure whether the mine decommissioning process differs in Canada and Ukraine. However, when we issue a license to operate a mine or any other nuclear facility in Canada, one of our requirements as a regulator is that an applicant reserves funding for decommissioning. Therefore, after completion of the operation period, there is already a pre-established fund to manage the mine decommissioning process, maintenance of tailings storage facilities.

So we have considerable experience in decommissioning uranium mines and it is quite mature. However, answering the question regarding adopting conceptual solutions, I cannot describe all the technical aspects, but, all our ideas and experience assume that after termination of uranium mining and decommissioning of the mine, the site will be safe again.

Currently we have several obsolete facilities that have been poorly managed. There was time when we had no information about the possible risks or waste disposal places. Some mines have been abandoned, but our government has undertaken to clean up these sites, and we are implementing projects aimed at disposing of obsolete waste. In my opinion, with decommissioning as an example, we have demonstrated that this can be a successful process with public support and direct involvement.

– One of the cooperation areas in the framework of the Memorandum is the improvement of regulatory activity in the radioactive waste management domain. Could you please provide us some information on innovations in Canada in this area? In your opinion, what modern approaches could be introduced in regulatory activity?

We have a number of innovations in radioactive waste management domain in Canada. First of all, in 2019, we had an IAEA IRRS mission to review the regulatory infrastructure, one of the recommendations of which was to update the radioactive waste management policy. So, after numerous consultations with the public, the policy was revised and updated, and along with it, a radioactive waste management strategy was accepted and adopted.

When it comes to high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, Canada’s plan is to construct a centralized deep geological repository for high-level waste. Currently, the waste is in wet storage pools or dry storage containers, but in the future it is planned to move this waste to a centralized storage facility. The siting process took quite much time, many public hearings were held, and it was decided that the site would only be selected after the public was ready, which means you would need public support to build a deep geological repository. The site is expected to be chosen by the end of 2024. Issues related to the construction of a deep geological repository are managed by a separate structure – the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization.

When you ask about up-to-date approaches, the entire international community has a very good cooperation in this area. There is an international forum on the construction of deep geological repositories, where the best practices and educational materials are exchanged. Consequently, Canada has accepted, adopted and updated some of the Finnish and Swedish approaches, which tend to be world leaders in this area. France has also made a big progress in this field.

One of Canada’s new approaches has been public involvement. We have a demonstration facility that presents a model of a deep geological repository, so it’s primarily an opportunity for people to come and see what it’s actually going to look like. This is what concerns high-level waste.

It was also planned to construct a deep geological repository for low- and intermediate-level waste, which would differ from the one for high-level waste. This process took more than 10 years, a site was selected, an environmental assessment was carried out and a site preparation license was approved by the regulator, but there was no public support. So a referendum was held and the majority of the indigenous people on whose lands the repository was to be built said “no”. As a result, the project was canceled. The main reason was that we wanted the host community to support the project. Many lessons were learned after that such as to start public discussions at an early stage and not stop them at later stages, to involve the community and the public to the discussions. Therefore, in my opinion, the question of modern approaches is very close to the previous one, because they are mainly aimed at involving the public and continued informing of hazards. No one knows what the world will be like in 5 thousand years and how we will be able to convey information about hazards to people.

So, under the new radioactive waste management strategy, we will have disposal facilities for low-level waste spread across the country, probably at existing nuclear facilities. The intermediate-level waste will be part of the radioactive waste disposal point (RWDP), but I am not sure yet whether it will be a repository like for the high-level waste, or an individual RWDP.

So, only recently has a clear roadmap emerged regarding waste management in Canada. We are actually fortunate that when it comes to public concern in the nuclear industry, the concern is not about safety or proliferation, but is focused on radioactive waste.

Therefore, with the new policy, strategy, plans, we warn: “If you want CNSC to license SMR technology, we require a clear waste management plan for the future. This is not an issue you can ignore. We want to know that today.” So, much attention is paid to the waste management issue, and it is quite justified. I think we’ve achieved pretty good results when it comes to waste management issue in Canada.

– In your opinion, in what other areas does the public need more knowledge and information, for example, SMR, RS, radiation medicine? Perhaps we could initiate joint informational and educational projects?

I think in Canada we have 3 priority areas. The first is small modular reactors. If you look at public opinion polls and a map of the location of nuclear facilities in Canada, you will see that the communities that reside near those facilities have a very high level of nuclear power support. They understand that it is convenient and ensures availability of good jobs. The support level is about 80-90%. Meanwhile, in other parts of the country where there are not many nuclear facilities, there is a lot of nuclear misinformation and disinformation. As an example, you can take the situation in Japan with the release of purified drainage water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The risks were low, but the panic and hysteria were high. As we plan to develop small modular reactors in new communities, we need to encourage and involve the public to communication with the regulator, because sometimes it is done too late.

The second priority area concerns radioactive waste. Failure to resolve this issue could impede the construction of new nuclear power plants. The primary challenge and concern here are that the waste will exist for thousands of years, posing the question of its necessity within the community. So, there are a lot of issues that fall into the category of “Not In My Back Yard.” (editorial remark: the expression “Not In My Back Yard”, can be interpreted as the resistance of residents to any proposals for the development and construction of infrastructural, industrial, cultural and other facilities useful for the community in general, due to the close distance to their immediate place of residence). However, what’s happening with new uranium mines that are being built or at least planned for construction? The company proposes a deal to the community, offering benefits from nuclear facility construction, including workforce training, job opportunities, or supporting local businesses. Currently, they are considering partnerships in nuclear facility construction and in equity, fostering shared ownership. Yet, it’s challenging to achieve this with waste disposal sites as they don’t generate income. In this case, it’s crucial to ensure that the risks are understood and taken into account in the best possible way, and to counteract the misinformation that exists in this area. This, in my opinion, is the second priority.

And the third priority, I think, is very close to the situation you are in. We know that there is a possibility of a nuclear accident at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and we are assessing what the worst-case scenario could be and its consequences. However, greater than the possibility of a radiation threat is the psychological tension, fear and anxiety of the public, which will cause more tangible damage around the world. Accordingly, we must prepare the mankind today, not the day when this may happen, and much more interaction with the public, educational work is needed. In my opinion, this is another important priority area that needs to be addressed and where we could work together.

– And finally, could you please share your thoughts on how the international community can support in obtaining reliable information on the Zaporizhzhia NPP status and how you can support the SNRIU in its further efforts to restore regulatory control over the ZNPP?

This is an issue that I spent much time on during my visit to Ukraine and meetings with representatives of the SNRIU, government officials, and then in Vienna at the IAEA General Conference with the Minister of Energy of Ukraine and the delegation of NNEGC “Energoatom”. The only official information that comes from the operating organization and the Ukrainian regulator is that the IAEA mission is present at the Zaporizhzhia NPP site.

The daily report that is provided contains data that is obtained from IAEA staff and depends on what the mission has access to, what it saw and what it was told. From the perspective of the regulator, I am not sure that this is sufficient to understand the situation at the ZNPP, existing risks, etc. Therefore, firstly, it would be useful to develop jointly with the Ukrainian regulator, the IAEA, other international regulators or even operators, a standard template that would contain minimum information, and then supplement it with available data. If it is absent, it should be indicated so. As I mentioned, together with the IAEA Safety Standards Commission we are reviewing the suitability of our standards for wartime conditions. You know, there is a technical guidance document and such a template will be useful in this case as well.

Secondly, it is the restoring safe operation of the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP. After control over the ZNPP returns to Ukraine, it will be necessary to assess the situation at the site, determine the state of the power plant, equipment, machinery, etc. These are necessary steps to restore it to a condition that will allow it to be operated safely and reliably. Certainly, in Canada, we have relevant experience, because we had nuclear facilities that were shut down for a long period of time, after which decommissioning began, and then a decision was made to restart these power units. Therefore, we foresee the support of the Ukrainian regulator, as well as the operator, not only by the Canadian regulator, but also by the entire nuclear sector.

And thirdly, it’s a readiness check. When the Zaporizhzhia NPP returns under Ukrainian control, you need to be prepared for it, invite a group of international experts to come and carry out a readiness assessment, similar to an IAEA inspection: to assess whether the right staff is in place, is it qualified, and whether your processes are restored etc.

And fourthly, this is the determination of ways by which we will receive more information about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Perhaps we should consider the option of involving a team of international experts who will be objective and able to come and gain access to the plant, and then provide a report on the NPP state the existing risks. At least, it is necessary to try to investigate this issue. So I think there are many opportunities to make important work and strengthen public trust and global safety in this area.

Uatom.org Editorial Board