Sweden’s Nuclear Regulator: Experience of Supporting Ukrainian Projects
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) has been cooperating with Ukraine for over 30 years. A number of international technical assistance projects have been implemented with Ukrainian organizations, in particular the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS), National Nuclear Energy Generating Company “Energoatom” (NNEGC “Energoatom”), etc.
Today, Sweden’s support for Ukraine continues, about 15 projects in the nuclear and radiation safety domain are being successfully implemented. At the same time, after the full-scale invasion of the russian federation into Ukraine, no technical assistance is provided to russia.
Read more about the international vector of SSM activities, communication with the public, and Sweden’s application to join NATO in an interview with Zlatan Delalić, Project Manager of SSM projects in the field of nuclear safety and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe.
– Zlatan, please give us more details on which projects are implemented under the auspices of SSM in Ukraine?
We have been cooperating with Ukraine for over three decades in a row. During this time, a number of projects in the NRS area were implemented. As of today, we have 15 ongoing ones in reactor safety, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (RAW) management, nuclear non-proliferation, combatting of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials, radiation protection of population and environment etc. This includes projects initiated before the war in Ukraine, which we continue to implement. However, after the full-scale invasion, the Swedish government provided additional funding for urgent needs in the Ukrainian NRS area.
Ongoing projects in the field of reactor safety are related to the purchase of extended licences for PSA (Project Safety Analysis) RS&RM software tools, establishment of a new UQB (Ukrainian Qualification Body) with transfer of competence and experience from SQC (Swedish Qualification Centre), supply of necessary equipment to ensure safety at Ukrainian NPPs, etc.
In the area of physical protection, a comprehensive modernisation of the physical protection systems at Ukrainian NPPs is planned.
Ongoing projects in the field of radiological safety include the creation of educational materials and guidelines on radiological safety, the implementation of initiative to improve the radiological monitoring system and physical protection in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, supporting the development of the Uatom.org website, preparing a roadmap for radioactive waste management in Ukraine, and providing assistance to WIN Ukraine for the creation of e-learning materials on chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological safety.
The direction of combatting of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials represented by the projects of supporting of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, procurement the new mobile laboratory, equipped with detection and measuring equipment for the SSTC NRS etc.
– In 2015, with the assistance of SSM, the Odesa Center for Nonproliferation was established at the Odesa National University. Do you continue the cooperation? What joint projects are under implementation?
The Odessa Center for Non-Proliferation was established to strengthen efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the Black Sea region and the Middle East. For a long time it was a kind of non-proliferation “hub” in Ukraine.
The main activities of the Center are training of students and young specialists, conducting scientific research, clarification activities for the mass media and the general public, creation of a platform for the implementation of joint projects for specialists from universities and research centers of Ukraine, Europe and the USA.
After the war broke out in Ukraine, the Center was forced to move to Malta. However, the specialists continue to work, organizing trainings online. As soon as such an opportunity appears, cooperation will be resumed. As for today, the project is on hold. Last year we didn’t have any activities in the centre.
– What projects has SSM in other Eastern European countries? Do you continue providing technical assistance to russia?
All SSM projects in Russia have ceased following the decision made by the Swedish Government.
As for technical assistance projects in Eastern European countries, they continue. This cooperation was launched in the early 90s in the format of the Eastern Partnership. Today, we are actively collaborating with four countries: Moldova, Georgia, Armenia.
Since SSM supervises issues of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, we implement projects in these three areas. Moldova and Georgia, for example, do not have nuclear power plants, so there, together with the European Commission, we are implementing projects for the construction of new RAW storage facilities. Also, we have the capacity building projects for radiation safety authorities and the non-proliferation projects.
There is a nuclear power plant in Armenia, but with only one of two commissioned reactors in operation today. Accordingly, we are working more on the capacity building of the regulatory authority. Last time we had quite a long “break” in cooperation. But recently we’ve participated in the Armenian Radiation Safety Authority workshop to identify their needs for support. And we’ve heard the different proposals, such as strengthening the legislation and regulations in the area, reactor safety and radiation protection activities. The Armenian regulator was also interested in the Ukrainian experience on some issues, e.g. diversification of nuclear fuel, building up the qualification body, so there could be a potential for three-way cooperation.
That is, cooperation is aimed at the areas that need strengthening and assistance. We contribute to the solution of challenges in the NRS field with each partner country in Eastern Europe, in particular with Ukraine, where help is required, we cover such needs to the extent possible.
– Are emergency response projects among the most important ones?
They are very important. We have a number of such projects in the Eastern European countries. The Tbilisi Regional Stability Forum is a platform for discussing these projects and establishing regional cooperation on emergency preparedness and response.
We had such projects in Ukraine some time ago. Before the war, we conducted a number of trainings together with the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the SNRIU. I remember that during one of these trainings, a question was raised about the integration of the Ukrainian response system at the European level. For today Ukraine (Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Centre) is member of the EURDEP providing on-line radiological monitoring date to the EU portal.
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has caused uncertainty in the nuclear field. As a result, the Ukrainians need assistance to strengthen radiation monitoring and safety. Specifically, the Ukrainian nuclear authorities have requested a mobile laboratory to strengthen operational capacity in the field.
As a response to this need, Finland has taken the initiative for the joint Nordic donation project “Nordic Radiation Detection and Nuclide Identification Module (NORDIM)”, in which the Emergency Management Agency is participating.
This project is a co-operation between the Nuclear Preparedness Agencies of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, which is led and implemented by Finland. The National Emergency Management Agency’s share of the project is financed by the Peace and Stabilisation Fund.
The mobile laboratory is expected to be delivered to Ukraine in 2025. After that, capacity building and training of Ukrainian personnel will be arranged.
– How does the improvement of Ukraine’s nuclear safety affect Sweden’s nuclear safety?
Radiation knows no borders. We all remember the Chornobyl disaster very well. Undoubtedly, Sweden suffered much less than Ukraine. However, we still had some consequences.
In the unfortunate event of a nuclear incident, neighboring countries are not immune to its impacts. Thus, we have to prioritize and safeguard each other’s safety
In fact, this is how SSM’s cooperation with the Baltic countries was initiated. After the accident at the Chornobyl NPP and the subsequent collapse of the USSR, we started to cooperate closely, because after gaining independence, the Baltic countries needed to create their own nuclear regulatory systems, in particular, the appropriate infrastructure, regulatory authorities and regulatory framework within this domain. Nuclear facilities of these countries could not operate safely without regulatory control. Helping was not just an option; it was a necessity.
Later, based on the same principle, a partnership was started with the countries of Eastern Europe, which needed the harmonization of national legislation with the European one.
– What challenges did Sweden and the SSM directly face after the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine?
First of all, in May 2022, Sweden officially submitted an application to join NATO. This demonstrates the concern of our state about the war in Ukraine.
SSM is closely monitoring the situation. We receive online information from the IAEA, from various open sources, including Ukrainian ones. Analyzing the data, our experts predict likely scenarios of events not only for Sweden, but also for the entire region.
– SSM not only provides technical and educational support to Ukraine, but has also been promoting the development of the Uatom.org website over 13 years. Why are informational projects no less important to you than technical ones?
In my opinion, it is important to develop both technical and informational areas.
The Uatom.org website is created for people. When society is concerned about problems in the field of nuclear and radiation safety and non-proliferation, they need to be given balanced, relevant, and most importantly, reliable information. “What happened? What could be the consequences? How to behave and what to avoid?” Ukrainians can find answers to all these questions in simple and accessible language on the Uatom.org website.
– In connection with the full-scale invasion of the russian federation into Ukraine, the issue of combating disinformation has become acute. Please share SSM’s experience in communicating with the public on the NRS topic?
Probably I should start with the fact that SSM has two websites: external and internal.
The external page contains information about the SSM, what we do, what functions we perform. At the same time, the areas that we supervise are clearly defined. For example, nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and response; scientific research related to nuclear safety; non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; radioactive waste management; radon; activities of the National Metrological Laboratory of Sweden and others.
We also maintain contact points where ordinary citizens can reach out to inquire about their concerns, and depending on the nature of the query, we route it to the relevant expert in that particular field.
The internal site is solely accessible to SSM employees and serves as a platform to highlight the most critical issues of the company. It’s a collaborative space where we collectively seek solutions to address these challenges.
– What issues are the Swedish public most interested in? For example, the introduction of SMR technologies, RS management, perhaps radiation safety in medicine?
After the accident at the U.S. NPP Three Mile Island in 1979, a referendum was held in Sweden, at which the citizens decided to continue using nuclear energy until 2010. Later, the Chornobyl disaster made its corrections – a joint declaration of several political parties appeared in Sweden, which said the same thing – the development of nuclear energy should be stopped in 2010. As reality has shown, this did not happen, but the vector of public interests has changed. Today, the use of nuclear technologies in industry and medicine, radon exposure is among the popular topics in Sweden.
– Today we met in the framework of the Initiative meeting to exchange information on technical assistance to Ukraine in the field of radiation and physical nuclear safety. What projects of the Initiative impress you the most?
During our meetings within the Initiative, the donor countries primarily focus on listening to Ukraine’s priorities, needs, and requests. After careful analysis of this information, we collectively determine which projects require immediate funding.
Recently, the implementation of multilateral initiatives is a good practice. For instance, when a donor country faces financial constraints, pooling our resources allows us to pursue more ambitious and larger-scale projects collectively.
Uatom.org Editorial Board