Yevheniia Kudriashova: “Communication with the Public on Radiation Safety Should be Based on Ethical Principles”

New challenges to the nuclear and radiation safety system first arose in 2014, when the war in eastern Ukraine started by russian troops led to the loss of regulatory control of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) over certain regions of Luhansk and Donetsk regions and the need to take measures to combat the illegal use and trafficking of radioactive materials in eastern Ukraine. Then, in 2019, under the Partnership Agreement between the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS) and the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU), the Inventory project was launched with the support of the US Department of State, which provided for an unscheduled inventory of radioactive materials. As part of the project, no radiation sources (RS) were identified outside the regulatory control, and the inspected regions did not pose a radiation threat to public safety and the environment. The main stage of the project implementation took place in May-September 2021.

However, less than a year later, with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by russia and the occupation of the Chornobyl NPP and the Exclusion Zone and Zone of Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement (ChEZ), Zaporizhzhia NPP, and industrial regions of Ukraine, the issue of non-proliferation of radioactive materials arose again. After the de-occupation of the Kyiv region and the ChEZ, the level of tension and concern among the public in the de-occupied territories increased due to the possibility of radiation contamination. This was the beginning of a new large-scale SURVEY project implemented within the cooperation of the SNRIU and the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA).

The Uatom.org Editorial Board talked to Yevheniia Kudriashova, Deputy Head of the SSTC NRS Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Monitoring Department, about the importance of the implemented projects and radiation survey in the de-occupied territories, the need to comply with the procedure in case of detection of radiation sources and raise public awareness on radiation safety.

– In 2019, the Inventory project was launched, under which SSTC NRS experts conducted an inventory of radiation sources in the eastern regions of the country. Tell us about the scope of this work and project findings.

The SNRIU exercises regulatory control over radiation sources in Ukraine. With the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the issue of physical control over radiation sources in the so-called “gray” zone, the area of the Anti-Terrorist Operation/JFO, where a number of powerful enterprises possessing radiation sources of various activity are located, emerged.

In 2019, the Inventory project was launched to physically inspect the state of registered radiation sources under the Partnership Agreement between the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS) and the Science and Technology of Ukraine with the support of the US Department of State and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The SNRIU acted as the beneficiary and Project Leader, and SSTC NRS was the direct executor.

Initially, a list of enterprises was identified where it was important to conduct a physical inventory of radiation sources and which granted written consent to the through correspondence with the South-Eastern Nuclear and Radiation Safety Inspectorate.

During the project implementation, eighteen extraordinary inspections were carried out at enterprises and institutions in the eastern region of the country. In addition, the SSTC NRS and SNRIU experts who participated in the project were trained by representatives of the US company Advanced Systems Technology and Management. In accordance with the information (previously obtained from the Register of Radiation Sources) on the radionuclide composition of radiation sources, their activity, models and enterprises where they are used, a procedure for performing work during an extraordinary physical inspection of radiation sources was developed and mastered. A secure database “Inventory” with a web interface containing information on available radiation sources based on the results of inspections was also created specifically for the project needs.

– In February 2022, the russian federation invaded the territory of Ukraine, and large industrial enterprises, including those where the inventory was conducted, were affected. Do you plan to conduct a radiation survey of the territories in the East and South of Ukraine after de-occupation?

During the implementation of the Inventory project, no radiation sources outside regulatory control were identified, but the information obtained made it clear that such inspections are important to protect the public and the environment from potential radiation hazards.

For example, in the eastern regions of Ukraine, most of which are currently under occupation, the number of radiation sources used by enterprises is about two thousand. Among them, there are nine sources belonging to Categories 1 and 2: six in Mariupil and three directly at Azovstal.

Radiation sources used at enterprises located in the unoccupied, but partially destroyed territories or those that are constantly under shelling, in particular in Kramatorsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, Pokrovsk, also pose a threat.

Taking into account the number of enterprises that use radiation sources in their activities and that are located in the occupied territories of Ukraine and those that were destroyed as a result of active hostilities, radiation survey and inventory of radiation sources in the de-occupied territories after the end of hostilities will be extremely necessary.

– In your opinion, which cities will primarily need radiation surveys and what is the reason for this? Will a new inventory of radiation sources be needed?

Primarily, these are large industrial cities with metallurgical and mining facilities and enterprises where processes are monitored using radiation sources, hospitals with oncology departments. Those cities where the number of registered sources was the highest before the occupation and hostilities. In general, physical inspection of all registered radiation sources will be required, as well as additional radiation surveys.

– Another comprehensive project of recent times was SURVEY. Last year, you conducted a radiation survey of the de-occupied territories of the Kyiv region as part of a joint project with the SNRIU and the DSA, could you tell us what stage the project you are in today?

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by russia, the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and another part of the industrial regions of Ukraine were occupied by russia’s troops. After the de-occupation of the Kyiv region, including the ChEZ, SSTC NRS experts conducted a radiation survey of the de-occupied territories within the SURVEY project. The objective of the project was to reduce public concern related to possible radiation contamination that could have been transferred by the russian occupation forces. About 50 settlements, more than 60 apartments, more than 130 private houses and yards, more than 130 public places and buildings, more than 840 km of roads were surveyed, and more than 350 suspicious objects were checked in total.

Fortunately, during the project implementation, no radiation sources beyond regulatory control and no radiation contamination related to the occupation of these territories were detected in the surveyed areas.

One of the project’s objectives is to establish communication with the public. To implement this, meetings were held with local authorities, communities; lectures, webinars, and street campaigns were organized. All information was promptly disseminated on the official social media pages and websites of the communities and the SSTC NRS, in local groups and chats. The project outcomes are presented at the exhibition “Destroyed Borders: Radiation Survey of Kyiv Region” at the National Chornobyl Museum. During the opening of the exhibition, the event “NOTlecture: Wartime Radiation Hazard” was also held, where the audience was presented with information about the project and the results of the radiation survey of the de-occupied territories of the Kyiv region.

So far, two Stages of the project have been completed and there are no plans to continue it on the agenda.

– Are there any signs of a radioactive source so that a person can understand that it is necessary to contact specialists?

So, one of the main indications that an object may contain radioactive materials is a radiation hazard sign that is applied to equipment or containers containing radioactive materials. This marking can be in the form of a label or plate or can be engraved on metal.

In fact, it is very difficult to detect such items without special equipment. Usually, such sources are of the sealed type – located in protective units – and can have different shapes and sizes. These units can serve as an additional temptation for certain groups of people with different intentions. However, falling into such hands can have catastrophic consequences. After all, if the source is depressurized, for example, spilled or dispersed, its identification by eye is impossible, and the radionuclide can be detected anywhere, in any form and after any time.

– If a person finds a radiation source, what should be done to reduce the risks of exposure due to contact with radiation sources?

If you have found a suspicious object, especially a metal object with, for example, a radiation hazard sign, or a significant radiation anomaly is detected with a household dosimeter, do not touch the object or approach the hazardous area. Do not attempt to remove or clean it yourself. Keep as much distance as possible and keep others safe. For example, physically fence off the suspicious object or area. Be sure to report the finding to law enforcement and local authorities.

– One of the focus areas of the SURVEY project was to raise public awareness of radiation safety issues. So how should we communicate nuclear and radiation threats with the public today?

Communication with the public on radiation safety should be based on ethical principles. This means that we should speak clearly, concisely, truthfully and responsibly.

Only accurate and up-to-date information should be provided. It can be presented in a dosed manner, if necessary, and sometimes reasonably limited for security reasons. Only actually measured data should be used, and no assumptions or manipulations of facts should be made. The information provided should be supported by real data. Only specific threats should be communicated, having preliminarily prioritized them among others, such as epidemic, military, and radiation threats.

In general, communication on radiation safety with residents of the de-occupied territories should be aimed primarily at establishing trust and stable communication between the Ukrainian authorities and the public living in these territories, overcoming isolation and integrating people into a single social, humanitarian, security and information space.

– Given the results of the projects you have implemented, have Ukrainians become more aware of NRS issues today?

Considering the experience of the full-scale invasion, when everyone collectively used potassium iodide at every opportunity, I am not sure about this. I would like to emphasize that it is strictly forbidden to use potassium iodide without special instructions from the Ministry of Health, the State Emergency Service or local authorities. We are still suffering from the long-term psychological consequences of the Chornobyl disaster because we live in fear of the potential consequences of both the past accident and the possibility of a new one. This fear is largely the result of the contradictory behavior of the Soviet government at the time, which first hushed up the hazard and then actively downplayed it. Therefore, a transparent communication policy is very important. The public has the right for reliable information, and the SSTC NRS succeeds in this.

Uatom.org website Editorial Board